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The ~roblem. Controversy has long existed regarding 
the diplomatic mission of John Slidell to Mexico in the 
period before the outbreak of the Mexican War. Sent by 
President James K. Polk, Slidell ostensibly had a dual pur-
posel to repair the damage to U.S.-Mexican relations created 
by the annexation of Texas, and to purchase a large portion 
of what is now Southwest U.S. from Mexico. Polk enjoyed an 
initial period of praise from historians for his actions in 
the mattero In the past few decades, however, a large number 
of historians have accused the American President of deliber-
ately provoking a war with the nation's southern neighbor in 
order to obtain territorial concessions. This thesis 
examines the controversy and presents evidence to support 
its conclusionso 
Procedure. The first step in the construction of the 
thesis involved a thorough review of secondary sources written 
since the time of the missiono After this primary sources 
were carefully consulted. A great deal of attention was paid 
to works of the principal participants themselves. Finally, 
correspondence between Slidell and Washington was examined 
and relied on heavily. Notes from these works were placed 
on cards and the paper was then written from these. 
Findings 0 It is the conclusion of this writer that 
President Polk did not deliberately act about to provoke a 
war with Mexico. Rather it was his intention to sincerely 
seek a negotiated settlement. The terms proffered by the 
President, however, precluded the possibility of any such 
settlement 0 In addition, the internal situation in Mexico 
was such that the mission was for all practical purposes 
doomed to failure from its inception. 
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ORIGINS OF CONFLICT 
When Mexico achieved its independence from Spain in 
1821, the new government decided upon a continuation of the 
Spanish policy toward settlement on the plains of Texas. 
This policy encouraged Americans, such as Moses Austin and 
his son, Stephen, to move to the area and officially take up 
residence. The sparse population of this, their northern-
most state, and their own inability and lack of desire to 
govern it undoubtedly were motivating factors in the deci-
sion. Soon, Americans, attracted by the availability of 
cheap, relatively productive land, outnumbered the natives 
by a wide margin. Most of these were hard-working families 
who desired a better life for themselves. Many others 
arrived in the territory one jump ahead of the law. For them, 
the outstanding quality of the region was its comparative 
lack of law enforcement. The Mexicans maintained the immi-
gration policy until 18)0 when they abruptly altered it to 
permit no Americans to move into the area. 
For the first few years after Mexican independence, 
there was no attempt on the part of the United States to 
establish formal relations with its southern neighbor. 
Finally, in 1825. President John Quincy Adams initiated dis-
cussions which led to the appointment of Joel R. Poinsett as 
the first U.S. Minister to Mexico. This man was eminently 
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well-qualified and thoroughly prepared to begin the task of 
arranging amicable relations. Unfortunately circumstances 
intervened which prevented his success. An important part 
of his assignment was to establish with certainty the 
boundaries between the two countries. Secretary of State 
Henry Clay instructed him to do no less than reaffirm the 
boundary line fixed in the 1819 treaty with Spain. Also, if 
at all possible, he was to purchase a large portion of 
northern Mexico. For this he was authorized to pay the sum 
of one million dollars. Although there were several com-
pelling reasons for Mexico to sell this region to the United 
States, she did not choose to do so. After two years of 
tedious negotiations, an agreement was signed on January 12. 
1828, which did nothing other than reaffirm the 1819 treaty. 
In April of that year the U.S. Senate ratified it; however, 
the Mexican Congress failed to do likewise by the May 12 dead-
line. At this point. the Mexican government accused Poinsett 
of stealing the only copy of the treaty to prevent its 
ratification. This was done. according to the Mexican ver-
sion, in order to satisfy American designs on Texas.1 
As Andrew Jackson assumed the Presidency, he inherited 
this deteriorated state of relations between the two 
countries. Since the new President believed that his 
lJustin H. Smith. The War with Mexico. Volume 1 (New 
York. The MacMillan Company. 1919~. p. 60. 
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administration should cUltivate harmonious relations with 
the nation's southern neighbor, he resumed negotiations. The 
new Secretary of State, Martin Van Buren, instructed 
Poinsett to offer up to five million dollars for the pro-
vince of Texas. By the time discussions were to begin, 
Poinsett had become persona non grata in Mexico. He had 
proved to be a convenient scapegoat by which the ruling 
Federalist party covered many of their own indiscretions. 
Finally, late in 1829. the Mexican government requested that 
Poinsett be recalled, at which point Jackson chose a personal 
friend, Anthony Butler, as a successor. The President 
ordered Butler, as his first duty, to begin "promoting better 
feelings and securing more amiable relations between the two 
countries."l Although the United States desired above all 
to conclude the boundary question, the Mexicans indicated 
they would do nothing in this regard until commercial rela-
tions had been dealt with.2 Accordingly, each country signed 
and ratified a treaty of amity and commerce in 1831. By the 
terms of this agreement, each side granted most-favored-
nation status to the other, agreed to promote and regulate 
the growing Santa Fe trade, and promised to restrain Indians 
IMartin Van Buren to Anthony Butler, October 16. 1829, 
Manning. W. R., Ed., Diplomatic Correspondence of the United 
States (hereafter DCUS>. Inter-American Affairs 1831-1860, Vol. 
VIII, Mexico 1831-1848 (Washington. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1937), pp. 8-17-
2Jesse S. Reeves. American Diplomacy Under Tyler and 
Polk (Baltimore. The Johns Hopkins Press. 1907~t p. 70. 
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frustration at each turn. Finally, in desperation, he even 
indicated his desire to attempt bribery in order to achieve 
the desired results. 1 President Jackson was quick to assert 
that "Nothing will be countenanced by the executive to bring 
this government under the remotest imputation of being en-
gaged in corruption or bribery.h2 Shortly after this inci-
dent. the Mexican government requested that Butler be recalled, 
which was promptly done. An atmosphere of suspicion and dis-
trust pervaded relations between the two countries. 
This hostile atmosphere first manifested itself in 
the Mexican attitude toward Texas. Where once they had 
welcomed the presence of American settlers in the region, they 
now took steps to prevent any further immigrationo In addi-
tion, they undertook a number of measures designed to 
tighten their tenuous hold on the northern province. These 
included the abolition of slavery. a move which would make 
the area less attractive for American settlers who relied on 
the institution; the imposition of a series of revenue 
measures calculated to work financial hardships on those al-
ready in Texas; and the encouragement of their own citizens 
to move into the area and hopefully outnumber the Americans. 3 
1Butler to Livingston, June 17. 1835, ibid •• p. 290. 
2Andrew Jackson. postscript to Butler Letter, June 17. 
1835. ibid., p. 293. 
3Rippy, OPe cit., pp. 8-9-
These steps reflected a very real fear on the part of the 
Mexican government that, due to American designs on Texas, 
they stood a real chance of losing that province. 
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These moves on the part of Mexico caused a serious re-
action among Texans- They first sought sufficient represen-
tation in the Mexican Congress and, when this move proved 
unsuccessful, appealed for official separation from the State 
of Coahuila. This plea was also denied. There followed a 
number of minor rebellions. and finally, a declaration in 
1833 that they were a self-governing member of the Mexican 
Confederation. The Mexican authorities did not recognize 
this step, but took no immediate action. In 1835, however, 
Mexican President Santa Anna proclaimed a unified constitu-
tion, raised a large army, and advanced northward ostensibly 
to force the Texans to submit. This action led to the long-
awaited declaration of independence. The war which followed 
was of limited duration. The most decisive battle took place 
at San Jacinto, where Texas forces routed the Mexicans. cap-
turing Santa Anna in the processD They forced him to sign a 
treaty by which Mexican troops were to leave and Texas 
independence was recognizedo Although Santa Anna quickly 
disavowed the treaty upon his release, this action had no 
real effect for, by this time, Texas had achieved its inde-
pendence. 
Throughout this entire affair the Jackson administra-
tion pursued a neutral policy with the exception of a single 
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incident. General Gaines, commander of U.S. military forces 
in the Southwest. crossed the border between the two 
countries with a detachment of troops. Although he did this 
for the avowed purpose of quelling Indian raids, his action 
must be seen as an attempt to give naid and comfort" to the 
Texans during the fight. In most other regards, the American 
government adhered to its announced policy. This was not 
true of private American citizens, however, for many of them 
either lent financial support to the Texans or actually 
fought in the struggle. Although what the citizens did was 
" ••• legal in most cases, unstoppable in others."l the 
Mexicans remained unconvinced, preferring to believe that the 
United States government was heavily involved. For a time, 
Powhatan Ellis, who succeeded Butler as Mexican Minister, 
believed that the Mexicans might sever relations with the U.S. 
due to " ••• the supposed interference of the United States 
in the war of Texas.,,2 Mexico did not take this extreme 
step, but hostility supplanted any vestige of cordiality which 
might have remained between the two countries. New American 
President Martin Van Buren did not improve matters in 1837 by 
granting official recognition to the Texas Republic. 
Ill-feeling continued into the 1840's reaching a 
lsmith. opo cito, p. 63. 
2Powhatan Ellis to John Forsyth, May 19. 1836, Deus, 
op. cit., ppo 326-327. 
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flood-tide by the middle of the decade. Three separate yet 
interrelated situations combined with a number of frustrating 
minor incidents to produce a crisis out of which would emerge 
war. The first situation arose out of a series of claims on 
the Mexican government by citizens of the United States. 
These claims, which involved anywhere from a few hundred to 
several thousand dollars, grew out of disputes over com-
merical and trading rights. Added to these. nevertheless. 
were some serious breaches of national honor for which pay-
ment was sought. Nor was the United States alone in pursuing 
claims against the Mexicans. Both Great Britain and France 
were doing likewise, the latter becoming involved in the so-
called "Pastry War" of 1838. in which French claims, backed 
by military strength, forced a settlement. 
The United States first sought to collect on the claims 
in 1829 when Van Buren, then Secretary of State, wrote Butler 
that there were " ••• several claims on the part of citizens 
of the United States, against the government of Mexico ••• 
which remain unsatisfied. You are directed ••• to urge 
upon the former the justice and expediency of setting apart a 
portion of • • • money, as large as can be obtained, to satisfy 
such claims~,,1 As was to be the case with later attempts, 
this effort proved unsuccessful. President Jackson was at 
1Martin Van Buren to Anthony Butler, October 17, 1829, 
DeUS, OPe cit., p. 17-
first inclined to be lenient on the matter; as late as 
December, 1836, he recommended that the matter be pursued 
with Itcourtesy and forebearance." However, in the next few 
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months the situation regarding Texas had so antagonized the 
two countries that in February, Jackson took the claims ques-
tion before Congress. There he proposed that his next demand 
for settlement be made from the deck of a warship and re-
quested authorization to undertake reprisals if Mexico con-
tinued her delaying tactics on the matter. He never carried 
out his threats. 
On the other hand, Van Buren took decisive action on 
the matter soon after his inauguration- In a sharply-worded 
note to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of 
State John Livingston stated: 
LI am writ~ for the purpose of inviting for 
the last time the serious attention of the govern-
ment LOf Mexic27 to the numerous • • • complaints 
of injuries to the citizens and insults to the 
officers. flag and government of the United States 
by Mexican authorities, and to make a solemn and 
final demand of satisfaction for them. • • • The 
unreasonable delay • • • and the apparent indisposi-
tion to take any effectual measures to prevent a 
recurrence of acts of the character complained of, 
have severelY tried the forbearance of the United 
States LWhQl may be justified in the eyes of all 
nations for anr measures they shall be compelled 
to take •••• 
The note was accompanied by a presentation of fifty-seven 
claims which had been authenticated. The tactic was 
l John Forsyth to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, 
May 27, 1837. DCUS. OPe cito, pp. 79-83. 
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apparently successful for the Mexican government admitted 
that certain of the claims should be paid and, after stall-
ing for nearly a year, proposed arbitration as a means of 
solving the problem. The United States immediately accepted 
both this suggestion and the Mexican choice of Prussia as 
arbitrator. Finally, after two years of delaying tactics 
undertaken by the Mexicans, five commissioners were selected 
and deliberations by the body began in August, 1840. During 
the next eighteen months, the commission reviewed a large 
majority of the claims and, at the conclusion of that time, 
awarded United states citizens slightly over two million 
dollars. Mexico agreed to make payments for a five-year 
period of time in quarterly installments. In fact she made 
three payments and then abruptly quit, professing an in-
ability to pay.1 Although it was common knowledge that 
Mexico was in dire financial straits, this incident added to 
a growing u.s. exasperation with her southern neighbor. 
Events surrounding the annexation of Texas did not 
diminish this exasperation. Soon after that republic 
achieved independence, it proposed annexation to the United 
States- This was quietly spurned by President Van Buren 
who argued that the existing treaties between Mexico and the 
U.S. precluded such action. After this rebuff, sentiment in 
Texas which had once been decidedly in favor of annexation, 
lsmith, OPe cit., pp. 79-80. 
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cooled considerably. Mirabeau Lamar, an outspoken opponent 
of annexation who had been elected president of the Republic, 
proceeded to lead his countrymen on a path of independence. 
By 1840 Texas had been recognized as an independent republic 
by the United States, Holland, Belgium, France, and Great 
Britain, and had commercial ties to the latter two. 1 
The change of administrations which resulted in the 
Presidency of John Tyler did not immediately bring a change 
in the American stance regarding annexation. Although Tyler 
himself favored adding Texas to the Union, he hesitated to 
press the matter for a number of reasons. The issue had be-
come closely identified with the raging slavery debate. Ant i-
slave forces viewed annexation as an attempt to spread the 
evil institution and could be expected to provide howls of 
protest against any such move. The pending negotiations with 
Great Britain over the Oregon boundary could possibly be 
jeopardized by annexationo Also, two key persons whose sup-
port would be needed, President Lamar of Texas, and Tyler's 
own Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, opposed the idea. 
Their opposition, while not absolutely final. would be crucial 
in an expected battleo The prospect of war with Mexico over 
the issue, although not something which caused great conster-
nation, was a factor to be reckoned with. These considera-
tions caused Tyler to delay any plans which he had for adding 
lReeves, opo cit., p. 87. 
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Texas to the Union. 
But a series of unrelated incidents caused Tyler to 
reconsider the annexation question in late 1843. For one 
thing, the Webster-Ashburton treaty suggested that Great 
Britain and the United States could resolve the Oregon issue 
peacefully 0 Secondly. Webster was no longer in office and the 
new Secretary. Ao fo Upshur, favored annexation. Finally, 
Sam Houston, an advocate of union with the U.S., had once 
again become president of Texas. He had pursued a policy of 
carefully courting foreign powers in hopes that his northern 
neighbor would view such proceedings with a jaundiced eye and 
proceed at once with the union. These factors prompted Tyler 
to order Upshur to take up the question with the Texas repre-
sentative in Washington. Issac Van Zandt. Because Upshur was 
not able to give assurances that the Senate would ratify a 
treaty, negotiations initially proceeded slowly. Finally. 
Upshur ascertained that the required two-thirds majority 
could be obtained and communicated this information to Houston 
who immediately dispatched a group of commissioners to 
Washington to negotiate a treaty. While these talks were 
proceeding. Upshur was killed in an accident and replaced by 
John C. Calhoun. This proved no barrier to the proceedings, 
and a treaty was brought forth in April, 1844. By the time 
the Senate received it. however, the two-thirds majority 
foreseen by Upshur had evaporated and the treaty was 
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rejected.1 
Once he became convinced the treaty could not be rati-
fied in the Senate, Tyler turned to another plan. Believing 
that haste was necessary to forestall British maneuvers, and 
probably desiring to obtain the honor of bringing Texas into 
the Union, he hit upon a plan which would allow both houses 
of Congress to vote in a "Joint Resolution." He accompanied 
his recommendation for such action to Congress with the fol-
lowing message. 
While I have regarded the annexation to be 
accomplished by treaty to be the most suitable 
form in which it could be affected, should Con-
gress deem it proper to resort to any other 
expedient compatible with the Constitution ••• 
I stand prepared to yield my most prompt and 
active cooperation. The great question is. not as 
to the manner in which it shall be done, but 
whether it shall be accomplished or not. 2 
Tyler suggested that authority for Congress to take such a 
move came from its right to admit new states. Although critic 
howled that the proposal was unconstitutional, the House and 
Senate did ratify the agreement with the result that Texas 
became a part of the United States. 
California represented the final area for conflict. 
The situation which existed in that province resembled the 
lDavid Mo Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Annexation 
(Columbia, Missouri. The University of Missouri Press, 19(3), 
pp. 139-149. 
2Message of John Tyler. June 10, 1844, House Executive 
Document 271. 28th Congress, 1st Session. 
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one in Texas. The region was sparsely populated with native 
Mexicans, and settlers from America as well as other foreign 
powers were at first welcomed. These people found a situa-
tion in which Mexico exerted little control over the region 
so that they were left largely to their own devices. Since 
they had little or no loyalty to the central government, 
separatist movements sprang up as soon as large numbers of 
foreigners arrived. The Mexicans attempted to quell any 
actual uprisings and for a time were successful in avoiding 
a major revolution. However. after 1830, the area was re-
markable only in its lack of stability. 
This situation prompted several attempts on the part 
of the U.S. to acquire the region. The first came in 1835 
when Secretary of State John Forsyth addressed the following 
remarks to Butler in Mexico City. 
LSinci7 the port of St. Francisco. on the western 
coast of the United Mexican States, would be a most 
desirable place to resort for our numerous vessels 
e~aged in the whaling business in the Pacific 0 • • 
Lthe Presideni7 has directed that an addition should 
be made to your instructions relative to the negoti-
ations for Texas. The main object is to secure within 
our limits the whole bay of St. Francisc·o. If you 
can enduce the Mexican government to agree to any 
lines which will effect this. you are authorized to 
offer a sum of half a million dollars • • • you may 
agree to any provision effecting the freat object 
of securing the bay at St. Francisco-
Nothing came from this overture. Butler indicated that he 
1Forsyth to Butler, August 6, 1835, DeUS, OPe cit., 
p. 330 
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had " ••• but slight hopes ••• of success" at negotiating 
such a purchase, but felt there was "no doubt of obtaining the 
privilege of using the port ••• 
The next time the subject of acquiring California came 
up occurred in 1842 when President Tyler stated that a settle-
ment with the British on the Oregon question might be on 
lines favorable to them if they could succeed in persuading 
Mexico to sell part of Northern California to the United 
States. The British apparently failed in this regard for 
nothing ever came of this proposalo In the latter part of 
that year. however, an incident occurred which served only 
to heighten Mexican distrust of American motives. Commodore 
Thomas Jones, Commander of American naval forces in the 
Pacific. believing that the United States and Mexico had gone 
to war, sailed into the harbor of Monterey and demanded that 
the Mexicans surrender the fort. The shocked Mexicans quickly 
complied. As soon as he had been informed that no war 
existed, Jones saluted the Mexican flag and sailed out of the 
bay. American authorities were just as stunned as their 
Mexican counterparts and infinitely more horrified. They 
attempted to assuage the damaged Mexican feelings by relieving 
Jones of his command and promising to make restitution for 
his error. Nevertheless, the incident served to impair 
1Butler to Forsyth, December 27, 1835. ibid., pp. 305-
306. 
relations between the two countries even further. 
During this period the United States had two agents 
in Mexico whose primary goal was the acquisition of 
California_ One of these was Waddy Thompson, American 
Minister to Mexico, who, in his first letter to Daniel 
Webster, noted. 
As to Texas r regard it as of but little value 
compared with California--the richest, most beauti-
ful, and healthiest country in the world ••• with 
the acquisition of upper California we would have 
• 0 • ascendancy on the Pacific •••• r am pro-
foundly satisfied that in its bearing on all of the 
interests of our country 0 • _ the importance of the 
acquisition of California cannot be overestimated. 1 
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A short time later, in a letter to President Tyler, he stated 
"r have but little doubt that r shall be able to accomplish 
your wishes and to add also the acquisition of upper 
California. ,,2 This prospect was favorably received in 
Washington. A short time later Thompson had a reply from 
Webster which advised him to proceed II ••• very cautiously 
and quite informally seeking rather to lead the Mexican 
secretary to talk on the subject than to lead directly to it 
yourself • • • the cession must be spoken of rather as a 
convenience to Mexico or a mode of discharging her debts.,,3 
1Thompson to Webster, April 29. 1842, ibid., p. 483-
~hompson to Tyler, May 9. 1842. ibid., p. 485. 
>Webster to Thompson, June 27. 1842, Quoted in 
Reeves. OPe cit., p. 102. 
Thompson proceeded to discuss the topic with Mexican 
authorities on several occasions, however, they indicated 
no interest in disposing of this part of their territory. 
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The other American agent concerned with acquiring 
California was Thomas Larkin, an American merchant in 
Monterey, who became a consul there in 1843. This energetic 
and intelligent man provided the U.S. with much valuable 
information. During the next three years, he faithfully 
reported on all activities in the region. mentioning the 
possibility of revolution on a number of occasions. He left 
no doubt of his desire for California to become a part of 
the United states, and was scarcely able to conceal his con-
tempt for Mexican authorities. He stated on one occasion 
that " ••• if a new flag was respectfully planted, it would 
receive Lthgl good will of the !Wealthy and respectabl~ of 
the country.1 In his years as U.S. consul, the reports he 
sent represented the only dependable source of information 
on which U.S. authorities could rely. 
The Claims question, the annexation of Texas, and the 
desire on the part of certain Americans to acquire California 
did much to escalate the state of relations between the 
United States and Mexico, already somewhat heated, to a 
boiling pointo 
1Larkin to Buchanan, April 2, 1846, DOUS, OPe cit., 
pp. 839-841. 
Chapter 2 
THE IMPENDING CRISIS 
As the year 1842 got under way, relations between the 
United States and Mexico. deteriorated still further. No-
where was this more evident than in the diplomatic affairs 
of the two. In June. the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Jose Maria de Bocanegra. protesting neutrality violations by 
citizens of the U.S., sent a series of stern notes to 
Secretary of State Webster. In one of them he stated. 
• 0 • the Mexican Republic has received nothing 
but severe injuries and afflictions from the citi-
zens of the United States • • • which produces an 
incomprehensible state of things--a state neither 
of peace nor of war; but inflicting upon the Mexican 
Republic, the same injuries and inconveniences as 
if war had been declared ••• 0 Could proceedings 
more hostil (sic) on the part of the United States 
have taken place had that country been at war wifh 
the Mexican Republic? ••• Certainly not •• - • 
President Tyler felt the notes were insolent and de-
serving of a harsh reply_ Accordingly Webster, after a delay 
sufficient to indicate that the United States was in no haste 
to answer, directed Waddy Thompson, U.S. Envoy in Mexico. to 
first rebuke the Mexican government for utilizing the 
unusual method of corresponding from the Mexican Minister of 
Foreign Affairs directly to the Secretary of State, and 
secondly to restate the U.S. position of neutrality. Thompson 
IBocanegra to Webster, May 12. 1842, DeUS, OPe cit., 
pp. 487-489-
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complied with the directive. replying to the Mexican Minister 
with a harsh note that ended with a thinly disguised threat, 
Mr. de Bocanegra is pleased to say. that if war 
actually existed between the two countries. pro-
ceedings more hostile on the part of the United 
States could not have taken place •••• This 
opinion, is yet abstract and theoretical •••• 
The efficiency of American hostility has never been 
tried. the government has no desire to try it. It 
would not disturb the peace for the sake of showing 
how erroneously Mr. de Bocanegra has reasoned. 1 
Shortly thereafter Thompson sent word from Mexico that 
President Santa Anna had been talking freely of war with the 
U.S •• and for a time it appeared that that condition might 
result. However, within a short time the Mexican government, 
for reasons known only to themselves, dispatched their first 
minister to the United States in three years, and the crisis 
was averted. 2 
The long and arduous task of annexing Texas to the 
United States was the issue which led ultimately to war. In 
August of 184), de Bocanegra informed U.S. Envoy Thompson that 
Events which have been occurring • • • have 
appeared to afford grounds for doubting the 
sincerity and frankness of the conduct of the 
LU.s~ .. 0 • The Mexican government has col-
lected sufficient evidence • • • that a proposi-
tion is to be submitted to • 0 • the Congress of 
the United States 0 •• to incorporate them with 
the so-called R~ublic of Texas ••• 0 The Presi-
dent LOf MexicQ! hopes lthe Congres~ will defeat 
1Webster to Thompson, July 8, 1842. ibid., pp. 110-1200 
2Reeves, op. cit., p. 99. 
a design so unjust • • • Lbui7 he has ordered 
the Undersigned to declare • 0 0 that the Mexican 
government will consider equivalent to a declara-
tion of war • • • the passage of an act for the 
incorporation ~f Texas with the territory of the 
United States. 
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Thompson, in replying to the message stated that he was 
"astonished ••• if anything could excite such a feeling 
LOf wail it will be the constant repetition of these 
threatse,,2 A short time later, Juan Almonte, Mexican 
Minister to the U.S., informed Secretary of State Upshur of 
the followings "If • • 0 the United States should ••• com-
mit the unheard of act of violence Lannexation7 the under-
signed will consider his mission ended ... 3 A lengthy series 
of verbal exchanges then took place. Mexico chastising the 
U.S. for designs on Texas, which it maintained still belonged 
to her, and the U.S. asserting its right to conduct affairs 
with Texas in any manner she chose. This impasse continued 
until May when a Colonel Thompson4 arrived in Mexico with 
instructions to the American charge, Benjamin Green, to in-
form the Mexican government that a treaty of annexation had 
lBocanegra to Thompson, August 23, 1843. DCUS, OPe cit., 
pp. 555-557. 
2Thompson to Bocanegra, August 24, 1843, ibid., pp. 557-
558. 
3Almonte to Upshur, November 3. 1843. ibid., pp. 556-5670 
4NO relation to the U.S. Minister to Mexico who had by 
this time resigned and whose affairs had been taken over by 
Benjamin Green, U.S. Charge. 
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been signed and submitted to the Senate. In complying with 
this order, Green stated that annexation "had been forced on 
the government of the U.S. in self defence, in consequence of 
the policy adopted by Great Britain in reference to the 
abolition of slavery in Texas." He went on to say that the 
U.S. would gladly "settle all questions between the two. 0 • 
on the most liberal and satisfactory terms. 1 Bocanegra re-
plied in a most sarcastic manner, 
It is certainly wonderful that a government en-
nobled and governed by institutions so liberal and 
so well-founded in the known admitted principle of 
committing no aggression. and especially to guard 
and respect in every sentiment and in every manner 
the imprescribible rights of man in society, has 
proceeded to the negotiation, approval, and even 
transmission to the Senate of a treaty which in-
dubitably and notoriously despoils Mexico of a 
Department. which by ~wnership and by possession 
belongs to her. • • • 
Bocanegra went on to state that the very fact that the U.S. 
had seen fit to negotiate on the matter proved that Mexico 
had been injured and was the rightful owner of Texaso There 
was every indication that Mexico intended no compromise on 
this complex issue. 
Throughout the fall and winter of 1844. as Congress and 
the Tyler administration contemplated the annexation question, 
Mexico and the U.S. exchanged heated correspondence regarding 
1Green to Bocanegra, May 23, 1844. DCUS, opo cit., 
pp. 586-587-
2Bocanegra to Green, May )0, 1844, ibid., pp. 587-591. 
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the matter. Wilson Shannon replaced Thompson as U.S. 
Minister to Mexico. and after a cordial welcome and recep-
tion by Santa Anna, began immediate and vigorous defence of 
American policy. In one of his first letters to Manuel Rijon. 
who had assumed the post of Mexican Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, he warned in language which could only be considered 
threatening that "the United States cannot, while the measure 
of annexation is pending, stand quietly by and permit • - • 
an invasion by Mexico LOf Texa!?" He did promise, however, 
that the United States was prepared to "adjust all questions 
growing out of ~annexation7 _ • _ on the most liberal terms_"1 
Rijon immediately replied, and in a lengthy letter, went back 
through the whole issue regarding Texas, defending Mexican 
policy in every instance. 2 Shannon bristled at the tone of 
the reply, despite the fact that such was commonplace. and 
demanded that the note be withdrawn.") Rijon. of course. 
refused to accede to this request. Shannon. acting on his 
own, then terminated communications with the Mexican govern-
ment. 4 The situation at Mexico City thus remained at an 
impasse during the next crucial weeks. 
lShannon to Rijon, October 14, 1844, DCUS. OPe cit., 
po 6460 
66). 
2Rijon to Shannon, October )1. 1844, ibid., pp. 654-
)Shannon to Rijon, November 4, 1844, ibid., po 66). 
4Shannon to Rijon, November 8. 1844, ibid., po 666. 
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In Washington when Almonte heard that the U.S. Con-
gress had passed the joint resolution for the annexation of 
Texas, he wrote to Calhoun denouncing it as " ••• an act of 
aggression, the most unjust which can be found recorded in 
the counsels of modern history--namely that of despoiling a 
friendly nation like Mexico of a considerable portion of her 
territory." After further stating that "0 •• the said law 
Lfor annexation of Texa§? can in no wise inValidate the 
rights on which Mexico relies, to recover the above mentioned 
province of Texas •• 0 ." He concluded by informing the 
Secretary that liThe Undersigned will say • 0 • his mission 
near this government has ceased from this day_"l The State 
Department received the note with genuine regret. and James 
Buchanan, recently appointed Secretary immediately replied in 
a most conciliatory manner. But Almonte never received this 
communication, for he had already left, officially termin-
ating his mission-
When the Mexican government received word of the pas-
sage of a joint resolution for annexation, Luis Cuevas, 
still another Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, in a 
tone reflecting sorrow more than anger. informed Shannon that 
due to this act of Congress " •• 0 diplomatic relations be-
tween the two countries cannot be continuedo ll2 Shannon, after 
1Almonte to Calhoun. March 6, 1845. ibido, p. 700. 
2Cuevas to Shannon, March 28, 1845, ibid., p. 7050 
an exchange of notes with Cuevas, informed Buchanan he was 
preparing to demand his passports and further stated that 
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"It is utterly useless to think of arranging our diffi-
culties with Mexico in an amicable way for the present or for 
some time to come--all parties here are clamorous for 
war. • e e' ,,1 
Shannon spoke correctly in his assessment of the depth 
of feeling in Mexico. The public outcry against the loss of 
territory, probably accentuated by fears that the U.S. would 
not stop with simply acquiring Texas, exploded with emotional 
outbursts. This hostile attitude can best be illustrated by 
statements contained in Mexican newspapers of the day, of 
which the following is a typical example. "Is it possible 
that Mexico is a nation of slaves, a wandering tribe, to be 
the prey of other nations? • 0 • War and only war can save us--
wa.r without quarterl 1l2 President Herrera, appointed only 
recently to the office. felt compelled to take a number of 
steps designed to bring Mexico to a state of readiness for 
war. These included a request for money from the treasury, 
provisioning and strengthening various outposts, and inves-
tigations of possible foreign financial assistance.) Despite 
lShannon to James Buchanan, Secretary of State, 
April 6, 1845, ibid., p. 710. 
2La Voz del Pueblo, March 26, 1845. Quoted in Smith, 
OPe cit., p. ~3~. 
3Smith, opo cit., pp. 87-88. 
such actions, no official announcement of war came forth. 
Herrera undoubtedly hoped that some arrangement could be 
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made which would allow Mexico to save face. and yet avoid the 
outbreak of war with the U.S. So in lieu of actually be-
ginning hostilities, the Mexican government contented itself 
with internal actions and harsh pronouncements-
On the American side, annexation also provided a 
dilemma of sorts. President Tyler felt that steps should be 
taken to protect Texas during negotiations and final action 
on the matter. At the same time he wished to avoid any 
appearance of hostile moves on our part which might be con-
strued by the Mexicans as warlike. Accordingly he requested 
that Shannon inform them of our desire to afford protection 
to Texas until the final outcome of the situation was known, 
and he dispatched troops to the Southwest and ordered war 
vessels stationed in the Gulf of Mexico to hold themselves in 
readiness. When these steps became known in Mexico, war 
fever heightened still further. 
Into this highly inflammatory situation stepped the 
first "dark horse" in American political history, James K. 
Polk. Nominated at a Democratic convention which had seemed 
hopelessly deadlocked, Polk was an experienced and able poli-
tician who had served as Speaker of the House for the previous 
four years and governor of Tennessee for two terms. Henry 
Clay, a Whig making his third attempt at the Presidency, 
provided the opposition. The Democrats, as might be expected, 
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drafted a highly expansionist platform which called for the 
immediate annexation of Texas and the occupation of Oregon 
all the way to 54 40'. These issues, although not the only 
prominent ones of the campaign, proved nonetheless to be the 
decisive ones. Clay appeared to be vacillating on the cru-
cial Texas question when he stated on one occasion that he 
favored its annexation, and on another that he favored post-
poning action on the matter. Whether or not this proved to 
be the crucial issue in the election would be difficult to 
determine, but the little-known Polk defeated Clay in an 
extremely close race with the difference proving to be only 
38,000 votes. Indeed a switch of only 5.000 votes in New 
York would have swung the election to Clay. Much has been 
made of the issue of "Manifest Destiny" in the contest of 
1844, and certainly this was an important aspect, however, to 
state that the Democrats received a clear mandate for the 
annexation of Texas from the American people, would be to 
grossly overemphasize one issue in an election of many. 
As the Polk Administration took office there was 
apparently a sincere desire on its part to improve relations 
with the Mexicans. However, the situation south of the Rio 
Grande was anything but conducive to such a task. As has 
been noted, public feeling in Mexico was overwhelmingly 
against any negotiations with the United States, and from 
all outward appearances, highly in favor of an immediate 
declaration of war. The current President, General Herrera, 
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named to the post following the ouster and subsequent exile 
of Santa Anna in December of 1844, proved to be a poor sub-
stitute for the departed dictator. He lacked the personal 
strength and qualities of leadership which made it possible 
for Santa Anna to govern. 1 As such, for the entire length of 
his stay as President, Herrera encountered innumerable plots 
to overthrow his government. 
Internally Herrera faced two major problems. The first 
of these concerned the condition of the national treasury. 
Funds simply did not exist even to meet ordinary expenditures 
of the government, much less make any payments toward the 
United States. This proved to be an exceptionally hard prob-
lem to overcome. The army became Herrera's second major con-
cern for it rapidly became less manageable. Unsettled con-
ditions existed in nearly every camp due to a lack of 
sufficient funds to pay, feed, and clothe the individual 
soldiers. Also a certain group of generals, most notably 
Mariano Paredes, became cognizant of the fact that they had 
the ability to topple any existing government. One had only 
to look at the past several months to know that this was 
true. Consequently, they continuously plotted one scheme 
after another. 2 
lGeorge L. Rives, The united States and Mexico, 1821-
1848, Volume II (New Yorke ChaSe Scribeners Sons, 1913), p. 53-
2Ibide, pp. 53-54. 
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To meet these challenges, Herrera took a number of 
steps. To begin with, he issued a call in June of 1845 re-
questing volunteers for the Mexican army. He did this partly 
to raise troop levels to a sufficient number, but mostly for 
public relations in order to counteract the growing public 
demand for action. Since the Mexican Congress had provided 
no funds for such an undertaking it was necessary to issue 
further orders requiring all who volunteered to pay for their 
own outfitting and upkeepo Under these circumstances. it is 
hardly surprising that few volunteered. The next step in-
volved calling the adjourned Mexican Congress into special 
session. He did this with extreme reluctance, for he feared 
what steps a body responsive to public demands might take. 
However. when it became apparent that Texas would agree to 
the annexation proposal, he had little choice. This body 
heard a report from Secretary Cuevas on July 16, that the 
Texas Congress had indeed approved annexation and the U.S. was 
in the process of moving troops into position to protect the 
newly acquired territory. The body took no drastic action at 
that time. however. one month later when it became apparent 
that American troops occupied parts of Texas as far south as 
the Rio Grande, the Herrera government felt that some strong 
action must be taken. Accordingly the Minister of Foreign 
Relations proposed to the Congress that "As soon as the govern-
ment ascertains that the department of Texas has united itself 
to the American Union or that troops of the latter have 
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invaded it, it shall declare that the nation is at war with 
the United States of North America.,,1 Although the Congress 
accepted on the same day an administration proposal author-
izing the seeking of a foreign loan, they took no action on 
the war measure. 
In August the Mexicans held an official election to 
fill the unexpired portion of Santa Anna's term as President. 
Although there were several candidates, the one who quite 
possibly could have garnered the most support, Paredes, chose 
for numerous reasons not to run. Thus, Herrera received a 
solid majorityo He then decided to form an entirely new 
cabinet, selecting for the crucial post of Foreign Minister 
Manuel de la Pena y Pena, a moderate who favored some type 
of settlement with the U.S. rather than waro The election 
and new cabinet did nothing to quell the public outcry against 
the administration, which bow found itself openly accused of 
cowardice. The government desperately needed to take some 
action to pacify the populace. Finally, it decided to move 
additional troops into the area on the Texas border to rein-
force General Mariano Arista, a loyal friend, who was there 
with three thousand men. These additional troops, however, 
fell under the com~and of General Pardes, who enjoyed the 
public outcry against the administration and was loath to take 
steps which might gain public support for it. Hence these 
troops never assumed their intended positions. Thus, the 
situation in Mexico in the fall of 1845 remained extremely 
fluid. 
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James K. Polk entered office in March of 1845 as the 
youngest man ever to serve as U.S. President. Perhaps best 
known for his reputation as a Jacksonian protege, he found 
himself niCknamed "Young Hickory" by his supporters, and set 
out to live up to this label. Indeed, the aging ex-President 
had exerted a great deal of influence on him in the past, and 
continued to do so after he assumed the Presidency. As one 
attempts to match Presidents with the times in which they 
served, Polk seems ideally suited to govern during this 
period of expansionist fervor. He possessed a vision of 
America as the most moral and deserving of nations. and he 
had no qualms about pushing for the ultimate in terms of 
territorial fulfillment. In addition, he faced no moral 
dilemmas over such pressing national questions as slavery. 
which might have disturbed other men. Of all the qualities 
which he possessed, however, none served him better than his 
consumate skill in politics and manipUlation. Hardened by 
years in the chaotic arena of Tennessee politics, Polk 
applied these tactics almost immediately upon his entrance 
into office.l 
1Charles Sellers. James Ko Polk Continentalist 
(Princeton. New JerseYI Princeton University Press, 1966), 
pp. v-vi, 214. 
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Two problems confronted Polk even before he took his 
oatho The first of these concerned the selection of a 
Cabinet. Although this is frequently a trying process, Polk 
faced even more problems than normal. He owed his nomination 
and election to a large number of groups and factions, each 
one demanding that they be rewarded with a high cabinet posi-
tion. Acoordingly, the President-elect made numerous tenta-
tive lists of choices, only to be forced to revise them once 
again. The only name which remained stationary was that of 
James Buchanan. He had impressed Polk on a number of occa-
sions with the depth of his knowledge on foreign affairs and 
the crucial post of Secretary of State was reserved for him. 
To add to his desirability, Buchanan was a Pennsylvanian, the 
state which had contributed most heavily to the nomination 
and now was demanding a suitable reward. Finally. Polk 
named the other cabinet members, and although there were 
outcries of displeasure from some quarters, Polk managed to 
mollify the great majority of his party.1 
The second problem confronting Polk before taking 
office concerned the Texas annexation question. He committed 
himself wholeheartedly to bringing the territory into the 
Union at an early stage in his campaign for the nomination 
of his party. The method of arranging this proved to be a 
thoray problem for Polk. He gave his approval to the Tyler 
lIbide, pp. 165-167, 194-203. 
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plan of accomplishing this by joint resolution, but when this 
arrangement appeared to be faltering, Polk, although only 
President-elect. decided to take matters into his own hands. 
Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri opposed to the joint 
resolution method, instead proposed that annexation be negoti-
ated by commissioners appointed by both the U.S. and Texas. 
Since the Senator was highly influential. his support 
appeared to be crucial if annexation was accomplished. Polk, 
therefore, met with some Benton supporters and proposed that 
the House resolution be combined with the Benton plan leaving 
the choice of alternative methods of annexation to the Presi-
dent. He then privately gave assurances that he would choose 
the negotiation method upon taking office_ This plan received 
the reluctant support of Benton and his supporters, who 
thereupon voted for the bill which passed by a slim margin 
of 27-25- Polk had cast himself into the annexation fray, and 
was crucial in securing the end result. 1 
In his inaugural address, the new President attempted 
to exploit the nationalistic spirit so prevalent throughout 
the country. In this enterprise he achieved remarkable suc-
cess. Portraying the annexation of Texas as a project which 
would greatly strengthen the country, Polk pledged he would 
strive to complete the union at the earliest possible date. 
He also discussed at length the possibility of foreign 
lIbido, pp. 205-208. 
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interference in the project. Stating that "The world has 
nothing to fear from military ambition in our government.", 
he asserted that foreign powers should look on the annexa-
tion as "the peaceful acquisition of a territory once Guil 
own. ,,1 
By far the largest outcry came not from Polk's remarks 
concerning Texas, but by his bold assertion that the u.S. 
title to all of the Oregon Territory was "clear and unques-
tionable." Since this country at that time shared occupation 
of the region with the British, the statement came as quite a 
surprise. He did not attempt to defend it in legal terms, but 
rather chose to emphasize the fact that since millions of 
settlers had gone into the Western regions, the American title 
had been perfected. It was then the duty of the government 
to provide protection for these citizens, and extend its laws 
"over the distant regions which they have selected for their 
homes." Finally, the government should be ready at all times 
to facilitate the movement of these regions toward full state-
hood. 2 
Although there were scattered protests throughout the 
country to the President's Oregon statements, for the most 
part the American public responded enthusiastically- This 
lHenry Steele Commager, Ed., Documents of American 
History (New York. Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inco, 19JijJ, po 
3080 
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was especially true in the western regions where "Oregon 
fever" ran highest. Newspapers and politicians in particular 
scrambled to get aboard an Oregon bandwagon. A public clamor 
began for the acquisition of all of that territory, and not 
"one foot of soil or a drop of its water" should be "sur-
rendered" to England. 1 
The British reaction to Polk's statements ran pre-
dictably adverse. For the American President to ignore twenty-
seven years of protracted negotiations, and assert that his 
country held claim to all the Oregon Territory was unthink-
able. Even Britain's peace loving foreign secretary, Lord 
Aberdeen, felt compelled to state that Polk's declaration 
might very well touch off a train of events which would 
ultimately lead to war. The British government instructed 
the Admiralty to dispatch a frigate immediately to the area 
in order to underscore their determination not to yield on 
the question. The Colonial Office was informed that since 
war with the U.S. appeared imminent, they should take measures 
to ascertain the military situation in Oregon. In taking 
these steps, the government reflected British public opinion 
on the matter, which wholeheartedly favored no compromise with 
the Americans. 2 
1S. Penn, Jr. to Polk, July 13. 1845. Quoted in 
Sellers, OPe cit., p. 237. 
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Polk's intentions regarding Oregon became clear a few 
months after his inaugural when he directed Secretary of 
State Buchanan to submit a proposal to the British which 
called for a compromise at the line of 49, a position which 
the U.S. had assumed frequently in the past. Clearly, Polk 
intended his inaugural remarks only to prepare the British 
for his offer of compromise. However. the British Minister 
in Washington, Richard Pakenham, refused even to submit the 
American proposal to his superiors. Instead. he delivered a 
resounding rejection wholly on his own. Polk then withdrew 
the compromise offer and negotiations on the matter ceased. 1 
When warned by Buchanan that danger existed in having both 
the Oregon and Texas pots boiling at the same time, Polk 
hotly replied that the U.S. shoulddo its duty and leave the 
rest to God and country.2 
Meanwhile, in regard to the Mexican situation, Polk 
attempted to repair the damage done to Mexican-American rela-
tions by the annexation of Texas. To accomplish this task he 
appointed William S. Parrot as a "confidential agent of the 
United States government." Parrott, although inexperienced 
as a diplomat, had spent considerable time in Mexico, first 
as a dentist, and then later as a merchant. He possessed 
lFrederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in 
American History (New Yorka Alfred A. Knopf. 1963J, pp. 63-
~. 
2Quoted in Sellers, OPe cit., p. 223· 
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contacts with officials in the Herrera administration and 
Polk hoped he could utilize these to "reach the President and 
other high officers of the Mexican government and especially 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and by every honorable 
effort to convince them that it is the true interest of 
their country • • • to restore friendly relations between the 
two Republics."l In addition to this assignment he was to 
faithfully report back on his impressions of the Mexican 
scene at every opportunity. Parrott was not to disclose his 
official capacity unless he " ••• clearly ascertai~~ that 
they are willing to renew our diplomatic intercourse." In 
that event, he could .1 ... state that the United states will 
send a Minister to Mexico as soon as they receive authentic 
information that he will be kindly received.,,2 Buchanan 
authorized a sum of eight dollars per day plus expenses to 
be paid to Parrott for his services. 
At the same time, Polk ordered Wilson Shannon, offi-
cial U.S. Minister to Mexico, home to Washington. For his 
handling of affairs while in Mexico City. he received a sharp 
rebuke from Buchanan, who bluntly informed him that his ser-
vice would not be needed any longer. To carry out vital 
functions in that country, Polk called on John Black,then 
lJames Buchanan to William S. Parrott, March 28, 1845, 
DCUS. OPe cit., p. 164. 
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United States Consul at Mexico City. One of his first tasks 
was "to ascertain from the Mexican government whether they 
would receive an envoy from the United States with full power 
to adjust all the questions in dispute between the two govern-
ments."l Polk thus had two representatives in Mexico. both 
seeking the same information. 
Parrott proceeded to Mexico City where officials there 
accorded him a cordial welcome despite the fact that a pend-
ing claim made him technically persona non grata. The Mexicans 
apparently knew of his status from the beginning, a fact which 
he attributed to "those opposed to our interests,1I by which 
he meant the British.2 His first letters back to Washington 
contained information concerning the widespread hostility 
toward the U.S. then prevalent in Mexico. He concluded, how-
ever, that the Mexican government would not declare war on the 
U.S. He based this conclusion primarily on the fact that 
depleted finances made the prospects of winning such a war 
almost nil. He also felt that internal prospects for a civil 
war were such that any external involvements would be of 
secondary importance. In August, he reported to Buchanan that 
the new Herrera Administration was opposed to war and favored 
lBuchanan to John Black, September 17, 1845, ibid., 
p. 168 e 
2William S. Parrott to Buchanan, May 29, 1845, ibid., 
p. 718. 
settlement with the United States over the Texas question 
and further I 
I have good reasons to believe that, an Envoy 
from the United States would not only, be well 
received; but that his arrival would be hailed with joy--An Envoy possessing suitable qualifications 
for this court, might with comparative ease, settle, 
over a breakfast, the most important national ques-
tion, while such as1we have lately had here would make matters worse. 
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This communication President Polk gratefully received 
in Washington. He submitted it, along with corroborating 
opinions from Black and F. M. Dimond. U.S. Consul at Vera 
Cruz, to a cabinet meeting on September 16. After some dis-
cussion the body unanimously agreed to reopen diplomatic re-
lations with Mexico, but to keep such information secret due 
to possible outside interference from such powers as the 
British and French. One "great object" of this mission would 
be to " ••• adjust a permanent boundary between Mexico and 
the U.S., and that in doing this the Minister would be in-
structed to purchase for a pecuniary consideration Upper 
California and New Mexico." Polk felt that this territory 
might be had for fifteen or twenty millions, but he was ready 
to pay "forty millions for it if it could not be had for less." 
Although it was decided at this meeting that the mission 
should be undertaken at once, in a subsequent session the 
following day the group decided to order Black "to ascertain 
lparrott to Buchanan, August 26, 1845, ibid., p. 747. 
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officially from the Mexican government whether a minister 
would be received."l Black lost no time in consulting Pena, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Pena, although hedging for 
a time, finally presented Black with a statement which read 
in part: 
• • • although the Mexican Nation is deeply in-jured by the United States, through the acts com-
mitted by them, in the Department of Texas, which be-
longs to this nation, my government is disposed to 
receive the Commissioner of the United States, who 
may come to this Capital, with full powers from his 
government, to settle the present dispute, in a 2 
peaceful reasonable and honourable manner •• , • 
In a subsequent conversation, Pena seemingly attached a great 
deal of importance to the person selected for the mission 
stating that ", •• for the good of both countries ••• a 
person suitable in every respect. should be sent, endued with 
the necessary qualities, and not one against whom the govern-
ment or people of Mexico, should unfortunately entertain a 
fixt prejudice, • , for example a man as Poinsett. .. 3 • • • 
Pena also requested that for appearances sake, that a U.S. 
naval force off Vera Cruz be withdrawn. Once this information 
was received in Washington, the cabinet concurred in Polk's 
1James K. Polk, The Diary of James K. Polk, Milton 
Quaife, ed., Volume I (Chicagol A. C. McClurg and Company, 
1910), pp. 34-35. 
2Manuel de la Pena y Pena to John Black, October 15, 
1845, DOUS, OPe cit., p. 763. 
3Black to Buchanan, October 17, 1845, ibid., p. 7650 
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decision that the mission proceed at onceo 
The subject of whom to send on such a delicate mission 
arose at the first cabinet meeting where Parrott's informa-
tion was made known. After some discussion on the matter, 
Polk proposed the name of John Slidell, U.S. Representative 
from Louisiana- No mention is made of any other choices con-
sidered, and his name received unanimous approval from the 
cabinet.1 
l p01k , OPe cit., p. 34. 
Chapter 3 
JOHN SLIDELL 
John Slidell was born in 1793 in New York City to a 
family of considerable means. His father occupied the post 
of president of the Tradesman's Insurance Company as well as 
a similar position with the Mechanics Bank. 1 The family was 
quite prominent on the social scene and, in fact. John's 
younger sister married Matthew Perry who was later to win 
fame in Japan. 2 Historians know little of the early years of 
Slidell's life, however, he must have been a young scholar of 
some note, for he graduated at the age of seventeen from what 
was then Columbia College. On his graduation he accepted a 
post as European representative of a New York firm which 
gave him the opportunity to travel widely- He also learned 
several languages, a fact which would later become signifi-
cant. After the failure of the firm in 1817, Slidell returned 
to New York City, where he decided to abandon his career as a 
lawyer. During the next two years he became involved with 
the wife of a theatrical producer with whom he was caught in 
a compromising situation- This affair, plus the fighting of 
1Albert Lewie Diket. John Slidell and the Community He 
Represented in the Senate, 1853-1861 lunpublished Doctoral 
dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1958), p. 20 
2Louis Martin Sears, John Slidell (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1925), p. 5· 
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a duel with an unnamed opponent caused him to reach the con-
clusion that New York was not suited to his tastes, and he 
moved to New Orleans in 1819.1 
Life in New Orleans proved agreeable to Slidell as he 
quickly set up a lucrative law practice and it was not long 
before he was invited to argue a case before the Louisiana 
Supreme Court. He appeared frequently before that body in 
the next few years. In 1828 he felt compelled to enter poli-
tics and launched a campaign for a U.S. Congressional seat 
from a New Orleans district. He supported Presidential 
candidate Andrew Jackson ardently. but while Jackson won 
handily, Slidell lost his initial try at politics. Despite 
his loss, he could term the effort a success because, in addi-
tion to added prominence, Jackson repaid Slidell's support by 
naming him U.S. District Attorney for New Orleans. 2 Events 
over the next few years placed a strain on the relationship 
between Slidell and the President, who evidently became con-
vinced that his political appointee was supporting John C. 
Calhoun on the touchy millification question and refused his 
request for a diplomatic post.] Evidence that Slidell had 
1Charles R. Craig, "John Slidell, Louisiana Politico,1I 
(unpublished Thesis, Tulane University, New Orleans, 1948), 
Quoted in Diket, OPe cit., p. 5· 
2Sears , OPe cit., p. 11. 
3Diket. OPe cit., p. 25. 
fallen from favor with the President is seen in the latter's 
letter to Martin Van Buren in 1833 regarding the untrust-
worthiness of Slidell in which he said " •• • letter is to 
put you on your guard of this man ••• • u 1 
Slidell returned to the political scene in 1834 when 
he made an unsuccessful attempt to win a U.S. Senate seat. 
This failure instead of discouraging him, made him even more 
determined to succeed, and he disposed of much of his law 
practice in order to concentrate his efforts fully on poli-
tics. At this same time, he met a young Creole girl of 
prominent social standing. Marie Mathilde Deslonde, and 
married her. 2 Despite the difference in their ages (she was 
20, he 42) she proved to be a faithful companion throughout 
the rest of his life. In 1836 Slidell tried for the U.S. 
Senate a second time and again was unsuccessful. Unde-
terred he campaigned for a seat in the Louisiana State Legis-
lature and won an overwhelming victory. While there he did 
little speaking. preferring instead to make his mark by 
performing outstanding committea work. Buoyed by his success 
in this endeavor, Slidell made a third attempt at a U.s. 
Senate seat in 1838, but was unsuccessful again. He retained 
his seat in the State Legislature that year, but two years 
1. . t 13 Quoted 1n Sears, OPe C1 ., p. • 
2Craig quoted in Diket, p. 7. 
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later lost it in the Whig sweep of 1840.1 
In 1842 Slidell made a fourth try for a U.S. Senate 
seat which turned out to be no more successful than the 
previous three. Fortune must have taken pity on such a per-
severing man, for in 1843 Louisiana due to population growth 
was granted an additional seat in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives and in a special election Slidell emerged 
victorious. Arriving in Washington, he displayed the same 
characteristics which had made him a success in the Louisiana 
Legislature, namely a willingness to sit in the background, 
while becoming a persuasive force in numerous committee 
assignments. He successfully sponsored several pieces of 
legislation, among them bills to increase postal service be-
tween New Orleans and Washington D.C., and one which would 
exempt from duties cotton coming into the U.S. from Texas. 2 
His first speech in Congress was one in defense of Andrew 
Jackson who in a mystery-shrouded affair, had been fined one 
thousand dollars by a certain Judge Hall in 1815. 3 For this 
he received a thank-you note from Martin Van Buren, who was 
at the time marshalling support for a try at the Democratic 
lDiket, OPe cit., pp. 49-50. 
2Sears, Ope cit., p. 25. 
3congressional Globe, 28th Congress, 1st Session, 
January 2, 1844, p. 96. 
Presidential nomination. On April 27, 1844. Slidell made 
what for him was an elaborate speech on the floor of Congress 
during which he assessed the entire economic situation which 
existed in the country at the time. This speech, in which he 
attributed the financial depression of the early 1840's to 
over production, extravagance on the part of many, and gen-
erally poor currency, won him some renown as an economic ex-
pert 0 
The election of 1844 proved to be crucial in making a 
national reputation for Slidell. He supported James K. Polk 
for the Democratic Presidential nomination, and success in 
this venture led to his return to Louisiana where he set up 
an organization for the fall election. Since he was unopposed 
in his own bid to return to Congress, he devoted full time to 
insuring a Democratic victory in his state. In so doing he 
involved himself in the so-called "Plaquemines Vote Frauds" 
which damaged his reputation to some degree. Whigs, who 
normally were able to carry the New Orleans district, had for 
years been accused of denying foreign-born U.S. citizens access 
to voting booths. Slidell. along with other Democratic 
leaders, hired a boat on election day to carry these persons 
to a nearby parish, Plaquemines, where they voted for Democra-
tic candidates. Losing the state by a slim margin, Whigs 
protested the affair claiming that the foreign-born citizens 
had voted illegally. Slidell led the defense against the 
charges, stating that since Plaquemines is in the same district 
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as New Orleans, no harm had been done. He also brought 
charges against the Whigs for alleged vote frauds in other 
districts. Although he was successful in his defense of the 
tactics, his name became associated by many with shady poli-
tics. 1 
On his return to Congress, Slidell busied himself with 
sponsoring several pieces of legislation. Because he himself 
was a dedicated worker, he offered a bill which sought to de-
prive Congressmen of their Per Diem expenses if they were ab-
sent from their job for reasons other than illness. 2 Later 
he proposed a resolution that the President be required to 
report to Congress all instances involving embezzlement of 
public funds by officials of the government. 3 He also began 
work on a proposed constitutional amendment which would have 
radically altered the method of electing the President by re-
placing the electoral college with a system which allowed for 
direct election by the peoPle. 4 
In his fifty-two years. John Slidell had proven himself 
to possess the qualities of intelligence, foresight. diligence, 
1Diket, OPe cit., pp. 18-19-
2Congressional Globe, 28th Congress, 2nd Session, 
February 21, 1845, p. 327-
3congressional Globe, 28th Congress. 2nd Session, 
January 2). 1845, pp. )09-310. 
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and a dogged perseveranceo He was to need all of these if 
he was to successfully complete the mission set forth for 
him by James K. Polk. 
Chapter 4 
THE MISSION 
The John Slidell Mission to Mexico has been a subject 
of controversy among historians almost from the time of its 
inception. Differences of opinion have existed about nearly 
every phase of the operation, but particularly has this been 
true concerning the intentions of President Polk during this 
time. Many historians, especially those writing in the first 
part of this century, have praised Polk, and found no ulterior 
motives present in the Slidell Mission. Others, including 
many distinguished persons writing more recently. have con-
cluded that the President was guilty of intrigue and down-
right deception in sending an Envoy to the Mexicans. To one 
eminent scholar, the mission and subsequent events offer 
proof that President Polk "baited the Mexicans into a war."l 
Another states that Polk had intended all along for the mis-
sion to be unsuccessful since it was "coercive fl from the be-
ginning. 2 still another more recent writer, has concluded 
that Polk indeed offered the Mexicans a compromise by sending 
Slidell to negotiate, but one that was intentionally so 
I For this op1n1on see Samuel Eliot Morison, Oxford 
History of the American People (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1965), pp. 560-561. 
2See Richard Stenberg, liThe Failure of Polk's Mexican 
War Intrigue of 1845." facific Historical Review, IV (1935), 
pp. 39-68. 
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severe that the chances of its acceptance were minimalo The 
burden and responsibility for the consequences of its rejec-
tion would then lay solely on them. 1 A thorough examination 
of the mission from its beginnings down through its unsuccess-
ful conclusion, sUbstantiates none of the foregoing opinions. 
Instead, a picture of a man without concerted policies 
struggling against the press of a dual crisis in foreign 
affairs emerges. 
Polk's attempt to alleviate the Mexican half of the 
crisis began in earnest soon after the Cabinet agreed on the 
choice of John Slidell to undertake the mission to Mexico_ 
The President decided to write him a personal letter in order 
to underscore the importance of his task. In the letter, 
along with informing him of his selection, Polk ordered 
Slidell to keep the mission a "profound secret • • • for the 
reason that if it was known in advance ••• Brittish (sic) 
French and other Foreign Ministers • • • might take measures 
to thwart it. 1I2 In his reply to Buchanan's official letter 
informing him of his selection, Slidell expressed great sur-
prise at being chosen. He stated that he did not believe 
lSee Shomer S. Zwell ing, "The Graebner Theses Con-
cerning the Diplomacy of ~m~rican Exp~nsi~n During. the Mid-
Nineteenth Century: A Crltlcal Appralsal (unpubllshed W~ 
Thesis, University of Iowa. 1968), pp. 121-122. 
2Milo Milton Quaife, ed., The Diary of James K. Polk (Chicagol A. G. McClurg and Company, 1910), p. 34. 
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that the United States and Mexico should go to war and con-
sidered Mexican intimations to that effect as mere bragga-
docio, for although he had " • •• no very exalted idea of 
the calibre of Mexican intellect ~I-1 cannot imagine that 
anyone • • • could have so small a modicum of sense as to 
think seriously of going to war with the United States."l He 
also asked Buchanan to take up the subject of the secrecy of 
the mission with the President, for although the President 
had ". • • enjoined on me the strictest secrecy • • • I was 
obliged to make an exception in favor of Mrs. S •• •• " whom 
he felt certain to deduce what was going on and ", •• I am 
not one of those who believe that a woman cannot keep a 
secret.,,2 
In what must be regarded as an excellent example of 
foresignt, Slidell mentioned some doubts concerning the mis-
sion, " ••• I had not thought that the LMexican7 government 
would have been prepared so soon to have received from us an 
accredited agent." He further stated his belief that If. • • 
they desire to settle amicably all the questions in dispute 
between us, but will they dare in the present distracted 
state of the country to give so great a shock to what is there 
called public opinion?lI) Despite the appearances of future 
I John Bassett Moore, ed., The Works of James Buchanan (Philadelphial J. B. Lippincott Company, 1909), p. 264. 
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problems, Slidell seemed anxious for the mission to get 
underway. Polk felt that the mission should proceed at once, 
for he undoubtedly wished to take advantage of the chaotic 
Mexican scene which made acceptance of American terms greatero 
Buchanan and others, however, suggested that it might be best 
to wait until it could be officially ascertained that Mexico 
was willing to receive a representative from the U.S. Polk 
finally agreed that such should be the case. 
Early in November, word came from John Black, U.S. 
Consul in Mexico City, that the Mexican government was indeed 
ready to receive an envoy. Accordingly, Secretary of State 
James Buchanan drew up a list of instructions for Slidell, 
which the Cabinet discussed and approved unanimously in a 
meeting on November 8. 1 In his dispatch to Slidell, Buchanan 
informed him of the Mexican acceptance and urged him to 
" repair without delay to your post and present yourself • • • 
to the Mexican government as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary of the U.S.,,2 The two great objectives of his 
mission were liTo counteract the influence of Foreign Powers 
exerted against the U.S. in Mexico, and to restore those 
ancient relations of peace and good will which formerly 
1 . f . t 92 Qua1 e, Opt C1 Of p. • 
2James Buchanan to John Slidell, November 10, 1845. DCUS, 
OPe cit., p. 172. 
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exl." sted." 1 Polk and B h t " uc anan apparen ly entertal.ned a real 
fear of foreign interference, since before they informed 
Slidell about how to deal with the Mexicans, they told him 
to reject any proposal which would allow mediation by a 
European power. The Secretary noted that the "First subject 
which will demand your attention is the claims of our citi-
zens on Mexico." He then traced the history of this problem 
back through the awarding of $2.026,139.68 to American citi-
zens by the Board of Commissioners, and the subsequent de-
faulting on payments by the Mexican government. Buchanan 
informed Slidell thatl 
It will be your duty in a prudent but friendly 
spirit, to impress the Mexican government with a 
sense of their great injustice towards the U.S. as 
well as of the patient forbearance which has been 
exercised by us. 2This cannot be expected to en-
dure much longer. 
Clearly, the President expected his Envoy to deliver a warn-
ing to the Mexicans if they chose to ignore this debt. 
The Americans understood that, due to the depressed 
state of Mexican finances, it would be difficult to pay these 
claims in money. "Fortunately, the joint resolution of 
Congress. • 0 'for annexing Texas' ••• presents the means 
of satisfying these claims •••• The Question of boundary 
may be adjusted in such a manner as to cast the burden of the 
debt due to American claimants upon their own government."J 
lIbido 2Ibid •• p. 176. 
3Ibid ., p. 177. 
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There followed a lengthy description of the history of the 
boundaries in that area, Buchanan concluding that the Texas 
claim to the Del Norte River was absolute despite Mexican 
protestations that the Neucas formed the true boundary. As 
to New Mexico and California, those subjects presented dif-
ferent problems. They had always belonged to Mexico and the 
U.S. could not dispute that facto However, the nature of 
these holdings was such that it would surely be advantageous 
to Mexico to get rid of them if she could profitably do so. 
New Mexico had always proved difficult to administer, and, 
as to California, it appeared doubtful that Mexico could ever 
hope to reestablish complete authority in that area. "Under 
these circumstances, it is the desire of the President that 
you should use your best efforts to obtain a cession of 
Lthese provinceil from Mexico •••• Could you accomplish 
this object, you would render immense service to your country 
and establish an enviable reputation for yourselfo lll 
Buchanan further ordered Slidell to consider the annexation 
of Texas to be an accomplished fact which at no time should 
be called into question. 
For all the above considerations, Buchanan authorized 
him to offer a sliding scale of payments to Mexicoo If that 
government merely recognized the claim to disputed territory 
that the Texas Republic had set forth in 1836, the U.S. 
government would assume the claims of its citizens against 
Mexico. If, however. the Mexican government was willing to 
part with New Mexico as well as recognize the "proper" Texas 
boundary, "You are • • • authorized to offer to assume the 
payment of all the just claims of our citizens against Mexico, 
and, in addition, to pay five millions of dollars •• ,,1 • • 
If, by some chance, Slidell could persuade Mexico to part 
with California, "Money would be no object when compared to 
the value of the acquisition." The Secretary directed him to 
offer as much as twenty-five million dollars along with the 
assumption of American claims if he could acquire that province 
w~ha boundary line that would include the city of Monterey. 
If it was not possible to obtain a cession which ran that far 
south, he could pay twenty million for " • •• any boundary 
commencingat any point on the western line of New Mexico, and 
running due west to the Pacific, so as to include the bay 
and harbor of San Franciscoo,,2 Of course, Buchanan stipulated 
that these amounts were maximums, and if they could be had 
for less, so much the better. He warned Slidell to be on his 
guard against the machinations of foreign powers, especially 
those of France and Great Britain. In particular it would 
be "most disastrous" if California was ceded to one of them. 
In order to prepare Slidell for a possible cool reception, as 
well as impress him with the importance of the mission, 
Buchanan concluded his instructions by sayings 
Your mission is one of the most delicate and 
important which has ever been confided to a 
citizen Of. the United States. The people to 
whom you wll1 be sent are proverbially jealous 
and they have been irritated against the United 
States by recent eventso ••• To conciliate their 
good will is indispensable to your successo ••• 
You may have to endure their unjust reproaches 
with equanimitye It would be difficult to raise a 
point of honor between the United States and so 
feeble and degraded a Power as Mexico. This re-
flection will teach you to bear and forbear mucho 
o •• We are sincerely desirous to be on good terms 
with Mexicoo • 0 • 
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Despite the fact that the initial instructions were 
long and complicated, scarcely a week had passed when the 
Envoy received additional orders. Polk felt it necessary to 
explain to Slidell that these negotiations should be brought 
to a conclusion "0 •• with as little delay as may be con-
sistent with their success •• • " since the President 
" ••• desires to submit the result to Congress before the 
termination of the approaching session •••• 11 2 They also 
sent the entire list of American claimants with this dis-
patch, and instructed Slidell to make certain that any 
agreement with the Mexicans on this question included all 
American claims down to the signing of the convention which 
had allowed them in November of 1843. In a post script, 
Buchanan felt it necessary to tell his Envoy to have any 
lIbido, pp. 181-182. 
2Buchanan to Slidell, November 19. 1845, ibid., p. 183· 
treaty concluded ratified by the Mexican government before 
he brought it home. l 
56 
Various persons in Mexico had recently informed the 
President that the Mexicans were now ready to negotiate since 
conditions in that country were steadily deteriorating. Polk 
thus became convinced that his policy of taking a strong 
stand in foreign affairs was working. Accordingly, he wrote 
a letter to Slidell which accompanied this latest dispatcho 
In it he warned ominously that "If unfortunately you fail to 
effect a satisfactory adjustment of the pending differences 
between the two countries • • • we must take redress for the 
wrongs and injuries we have suffered into our own hands, and 
I will calIon Congress to provide the proper remedieso,,2 
Armed with his instructions, Slidell set sail for 
Vera Cruz on November 20, 1845 aboard the sloop of war St. 
Marys. He arrived in that city on November 30, to be greeted 
courteously by officials there. A leading citizen, Mr. 
Hargous, told him that he would find the Mexican government 
hard to deal with since they expected a heavy indemnity from 
the U.S. for recognition of the Rio Del Norte boundary_ 
Slidell intended to "correct this impression" as soon as he 
possibly could. He announced his intention to leave for 
1Ibid •• pp. 183-184. 
2Polk to Slidell, November 10, 1845. Polk Papers, 
University of Iowa. 
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Mexico City the following day, but confided his fears to 
Buchanan that the journey would end as many of his predeces-
sors had, with a robbery at the hands of bandits who were 
extremely numerous throughout the country. Although he 
would be furnished with an escort, this did not alleviate 
his fears since these had proven ". • • not always • • • 
sufficient protection" and he took the " • •• precaution to 
cut from my instructions, the words fixing the different sums 
which I am to offer in certain contingencies."l 
Although the American government obviously desired 
that the mission be kept secret, such was not the case. The 
Mexican press knew about the proposed meeting from the first, 
and, much to the surprise of Slidell, he found himself greeted 
by expressions of contempt in newspapers as well as in 
specially printed circulars. One paper, hostile to the pres-
ent government, denounced that regime, accusing it of en-
gaging in "horrible treason". It went on to disclose nearly 
the full details of his pending negotiations with the govern-
ment, including his offers to purchase New Mexico and 
California. It urged the people of Mexico to revolt and 
overthrow the Herrera Regime since "a few months more and we 
shall have no country left at all. 1I2 
lSlidell to Buchanan, November 30, 1845, ibid., pp. 
776-777-
2El Amigo del Pueblo, November, 1, 1845, Quoted in David 
M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Annexatlon (Columbia, Missouri: 
The University of Missouri Press, 1973), p. 354. 
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The Mexican government of President Herrera, aside 
from this public criticism, faced mtaggering problems. The 
Cabinet was badly divided on the question of how to deal with 
the U.S. Opinions ranged from a desire on the part of cer-
tain members to sell the provinces and be done with the prob-
lems, to that of the Minister of War, Pedro Anaya, who called 
for an all-out offensive war. In the end, however, most of 
the Cabinet agreed that without additional funds, such a war 
would be useless. Attempts to secure foreign loans met with 
no success, and the financial situation remained acute. In 
addition to these problems, Herrera had real cause to doubt 
the allegiance of the army, without which he could not 
possibly hope to survive. When he ordered the best of the 
Mexican troops north to reinforce the Texas border, their 
general, Mariano Paredes, refused to go, pleading lack of 
supplies. Constant plotting by various factions was the 
order of the day, and one could hardly tell from which direc-
tion the next threat to the government would come. l The 
Herrera Regime only hoped that it could survive until the 
first of January, when a new Congress would convene. strong 
support from that group could turn the tide in its favor. 
As Slidell traveled between Vera Cruz and Mexico City 
he met John Black at Puebla. Black had been in almost con-
stant touch with the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
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Manuel de la Pena y Pena. Slidell and the Consul conferred 
and decided that Black should calion Pena as soon as they 
arrived in Mexico City and present Slidell's credentials to 
him. Accordingly, on December 8, Black had the first of two 
meetings with the Mexican Minister. In addition to presenting 
the credentials, Black enclosed a note from Slidell which 
asked that a date be set for his meeting with representatives 
of the Mexican governmento Pena expressed shock at the 
American Minister's early arrival, stating that it was his 
impression that he would not arrive until after the first of 
the year. He had hoped that such would be the case since the 
Mexican government was just then in the process of communi-
cating with the various Departments in order to obtain their 
opinions on how to proceed. He also spoke quite frankly about 
the strength of the opposition to the Herrera Regime. adding 
that it would be necessary for the government to proceed very 
cautiously, at least until after the first of the year. How-
ever, he took Slidell's credentials to examine them. 
During the course of this first conversation, Pena 
casually asked Black who had been appointed Secretary of the 
Mission. When Black responded that he supposed it would be 
Dr. Parrott, the Mexican Minister became very agitated, and 
flatly proclaimed Parrott persona non grata in Mexico. Pre-
sumably this was due to the nature of the Doctor's claims 
against that country. He concluded the meeting by promising 
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a reply on December 10.1 When that day arrived, Black re-
ceived a note from Pena's secretary which stated that a reply 
would not be forthcoming due to the necessity of submitting 
the credentials to the Government Council for adviceo This 
group was composed of leading citizens in the country, but 
generally reflected the views of the church. 2 On the thir-
teenth, Black called on the Mexican Minister at his home to 
inquire when an answer would be given to Slidell's request 
for a meeting. At this time Pena broached the subject of 
the title given to Slidell as Envoy Extraordinary and Ministe 
Plenipotentiary. He stated that he felt this was not correct 
since there had been a suspension of relations between the 
U.S. and Mexico and to receive such a Minister would imply 
that a resumption of diplomatic intercourse had taken place. 
He did not press the point at this time, but once again ob-
jected strenuously to the appointment of Parrott as Secretary. 
The meeting on the thirteenth closed with Pena expressing 
happiness at the selection of Slidell as Minister, for he 
had II ••• received very favorable information in relation 
"J to OlimJ. 
l John Black to Slidell, December 15, 1845, DCUS, OPe 
cit., p. 778. 
2Louis Martin Sears, John Slidell (Durham, North 
Carolina. Duke University Press, 1925), po 60. 
JBlack to Slidell, December 15, 1845, DCUS, op. cit., 
p. 778. 
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When Black informed Slidell about the nature of his 
meetings with Pena, the American Minister was very dis-
gruntled. Pena had given the Consul a note for him at their 
last meeting which was vague and uncertain. In Slidell's 
opinion the present Mexican government wished to negotiate 
with him, but dared not in the present climate of the 
Capital. He felt the decision to submit his credentials to 
the Advisory Council was a device by Herrera to shift respons-
ibility for the decision to that body_ But, regardless of 
whether that was true or not, 
This, at least, is certain, the Administration 
in referring a matter entirely within its own com-
petence to a body whose decision they cannot con-
trol, and upon whose sympathies they cannot rely, 
manifest either a weakness or a bad faith which 
renders the prospect of any favorable issue to 1 
negotiations with them at best very problematical. 
He informed Secretary Buchanan that decisions of the Council 
soon became common knowledge and he had already ascertained 
that they advised the Administration not to receive him. He 
had even been made aware of the reasons they had given for 
their advice. These included the fact that his credentials 
had not been "sanctioned" by Congress; his appointment had 
not been confirmed by the Senate; that the only subject for 
talks was to be Texas. while Slidell was authorized to dis-
cuss any matters; and the aforesaid reason that his credentials 
named him as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, 
lSlidell to Buchanan, December 17, 1845, ibid., po 780. 
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while Mexico had agreed to receive only a Commissioner. Al-
though he intended to continue the mission, he still felt that 
nothing could be gained by pressing this government since 
". • • their existence hangs by a thread and they retain 
power not by their own force, but solely by the inability of 
their opponents to agree among themselves." In his opinion a 
revolution would soon occur and the U.S. would be left facing 
a government " •• 0 more hostile, but possessing greater 
energy." He concluded gloomily that "A refusal to treat 
with or even receive me at all, •• is a possible, I ought 
to say probable, evento" In that case he intended to place 
the entire blame for the failure of the mission on the 
M . 1 eXl.cans. 
On December 20, Slidell wrote to Pena stating that his 
credentials were certainly in order referring to Mexican 
agreement to receive an Envoy "with full powers" to adjust 
disputes. 2 That same day, Pena's official letter arrived 
which advised him that the Mexican government " ••• regrets 
to inform him, that although the Supreme Government of the 
Republic is animated by pacific and conciliatory intentions 
.. t . th t 0 it should admit His ••• l.t does no concel.ve a·· 
Excellency, Mr. Slidell, in the character in which he is 
l Ibid ., pp. 781-782. 
2S1idell to Pena, December 20, 1845, ibid., p. 787-
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invested. • • ." The intelligence that Slidell had received 
concerning the probable refusal to receive him and the rea-
sons for it was quite accurate. Pena stated that the 
Mexican government had agreed to receive a Commissioner ad 
hoc, one which would deal only with the subject of Texaso If 
Mexico received a full Minister Plenipotentiary, reasoned the 
Mexican Minister, they would be admitting that diplomatic re-
lations had been resumed " ••• which could not be the case 
until the questions which have led to the present interrup-
tion of those relations should have been settled in a manner 
peaceful, but at the same time, honourable, to Mexico." He 
went on to imply that the mere desire of the President of the 
United States to restore good relations was not enough. Pena 
ended by stating that the sentiments expressed to Black by 
the Mexican government on October 14, when they indicated 
they would receive a Commissione, had not changed, it would 
be glad to receive Slidell when he presented proper cre-
dentials. 1 
Slidell could not have been surprised at this bit of 
news, and in a lengthy, and at times, sarcastic letter, he 
replied on December 24 to Pena's note. In a point-by-point 
refutation of the arguments presented by the Mexican Minister, 
he at first compared the aggrieved feelings of Mexico 
1pena to Slidell, December 20, 1845, ibid., pp. 787-
789. 
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regarding the Texas question to the similarly bitter feelings 
in the U.S. over the claims issue, stating that the United 
States had " 1 . t b • • • comp a1n setter founded, and more 
serious." He then recounted, in what must have been excruci-
ating detail, the entire history of the American claims. 
winding up with the Mexican refusal to keep its "solemn 
treaty stipulations ll by its refusal to pay. He, of course, 
defended the nature of his credentials arguing that Mexico 
had agreed to see a ". • • Commissioner • • • with full powers 
to settle the present dispute ••• ,II In regard to his title, 
Slidell responded by stating he h. 
• • will not do Y(our) 
E(xcellency) the injustice to suppose, that any reliance is 
placed by Y.E. in the mere verbal distinction between the 
terms Envoy and Commissioner. , •• " He also pointed to 
instances where Pena had interchangable referred to the terms 
Commissioner and Plenipotentiary to give weight to his agru-
ment that the actual title of the representative of the U.S. 
was irrelevant and unimportant. Slidell concluded by stating 
that "Mexico, rejects the olive branch which has been so 
frankly extended to her." and, if the present circumstances 
should lead to war, ", •• the sole responsibility of such a 
calamity, with all its consequences, must rest with the Mexican 
Republic."l In these statements, Slidell undoubtedly 
lSlidell to Pena, December 24, 1845. ibid., pp. 790-
800. 
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reflected the sentiments of Polk. In his annual message to 
Congress that same month, the President had referred to the 
grave possibility of war, but stated that he was willing to 
await the outcome of the Slidell Mission before recommending 
to Congress, ". • • ulterior measures of redress for the 
wrongs and injuries we have borneo • 0 
In his report back to Buchanan. Slidell seemed most 
concerned about his reply to Pena being too lenient. His 
refusal to reply in stronger terms he attributed to two 
reasons I first. it was his feeling that the Mexican refusal 
was dictated by fears regarding the internal situation. and 
secondly, he felt that the "relative situation" of the two 
countries, lying so close to one another, precluded the use 
of harsh language. He commented at length on the existing 
internal situation in Mexico, concluding that General Herrera 
would soon be replaced, most likely by another military man~ 
Slidell was frank to admit his distrust and contempt for 
the people of Mexico stating "As for a people, in the proper 
sense of the term, it does not exist in Mexico, the masses 
are totally indifferent to all the revolutions that are going 
on, and submit with the most stupid indifference to any 
masters that may be imposed upon them." He sounded an omin-
ous note in his conclusion by warnings 
of the 
{Washington: 
Of one thing, however, I feel assured, that 
after what has occurred, should any concession 
b? ~ade by our gov~rnment, if any American 
Mlnlster present hlmself here, without an un-
qualified retraction ••• of Mr. Pena Y Pena's 
note • 0 • he will come on a bootless errand. 
T~e desir~ of our government to secure peace 
wlll be.mlsta~en for timidity, the most extravagant 
pretent~ons wlll be made and insisted upon, until 
the Mexlcan people shall be convinced by hostile 
demonstrations, that our differences must be 
settlei promptly, either by negotiation or the 
sword. 
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Two days later, Slidell met with Charles Bankhead, the 
British Minister to Mexico, who informed him that Pena had 
requested that Slidell be advised that the reason for his re-
jection lay in the present critical state of internal 
affairs. Slidell had been suspicious of British motives in 
Mexico, and asked Bankhead point-blank whether he had ad-
vised the Mexicans to refuse to receive him. The British 
Minister replied that he had given no advice on the matter 
to the Mexicans and certainly could not recollect expressing 
any opinions regarding the American Minister's reception. 
Slidell could scarcely believe such a statement, and ex-
pressed the belief privately that while the British might 
wish to prevent a war, they would doubtless prefer that U.S.-
Mexican relations remain as strained as possible. 2 
Slidell had reason to be suspicious of British 
lSlidell to Buchanan, December 27. 1845. ibido, pp-
800-803. 
2Slidell to Buchanan, December 29. 1845, ibid., ppo 
804-805_ 
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intentions. At that time the Oregon situation appeared to 
be reaching a climax, with both sides having stiffened 
earlier positions. So crucial was the problem in the North-
west, that the President devoted nearly his full efforts to 
it. Although he appeared to be ready for some type of com-
promise in mid-December, Polk was wary of taking any action 
which might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. He felt 
very strongly that in this matter he had the backing of the 
vast majority of his countrymen, and as such was determined 
that the British accept the American plan of compromise 
already offered. For a President who had been in office 
less than a year, Polk had faced incredible international 
pressure on two fonts. However, he was determined not to 
yield. 
Awaiting word of Slidell's reception, Buchanan felt 
compelled to communicate to his Minister further instruc-
tions regarding the payment to Mexico of certain sums of 
money. In his letter, the Secretary indicated 
From the state of the public Treasury, an 
immediate draft upon it for six millions of dol-
lars, might be honored without inconve~ience. 
Should it become necessary • 0 • you m~ght there-
fore stipulate to pay this sum in cash on the ;f 
ratification of any treaty ••• the. balance, ~ 
any, could be paid in four equal sem~-annual 
installments. 
In a profoundly important paragraph, which reflected the 
feelings of President Polk, Buchanan wrote 
I need add nothing to wha~ I have alre~dy said, 
to convince you of the vast ~mportance wh~ch the 
President attaches to the accomplishment of the 
one or the other of those two last alternatives (~he purchase of New Mexico and California) ••• 
e~ther of ~hem would secure incalculable advant-
ages to th~s country~ Under these circumstances, 
I need scarcely again urge you to exert all hon-
orable means to accomplish the settlement •••• 
If this ?annot b~ ef~ected: or if after obtaining 
all the ~nformat~on ~n your power, you discover 
that the.attempt.to effect it would endanger your 
success ~n secur~ng the one or the other of the 
first two objects mentioned in your instructions-
(Texas question and American claims) then, you a~e 
not to sacrifice these in the pursuit of what is 
unattainable. 
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The Mexican government undoubtedly had two major con-
siderations in mind when making the decision to refuse to 
treat with Slidell. Foremost in their minds was the internal 
situation in which the Herrera Regime found itself. Besieged 
by enemies on all sides. the only hope for survival lay in 
maintaining what control they had until the first of the 
year when the new Mexican Congress would meet. To exhibit 
any weakness, such as a willingness to deal with the hated 
Americans. would have been an open invitation to rebellion 
by any of a number of various factions. The current problems 
between the United States and Great Britain over Oregon pro-
vided a second consideration. It was, at the time. widely 
surmised worldwide that the differences could lead to a war. 
If such an eventuality should occur, the Americans would 
undoubtedly be paying far more attention to this northern 
lBuchanan to Slidell, December 17, 1845, ibid., pp. 
184-185. 
problem than the one on their southern border. Quite pos-
sibly Mexico would be free to act as she chose regarding her 
former province, Texas. 
When Slidell received his formal rejection from the 
Mexican government, he decided to move his mission from the 
Mexican capital to Jalapa, a city approximately one hundred 
miles to the east. In doing so, he cited three main consid-
erations. First and foremost, this was to be a demonstration 
of American firmness in the face of his rejection. He did 
not wish to appear as though he would be waiting around 
Mexico City for the government to see him at its convenience. 
Since Jalapa was located on the way back to Washington, this 
would surely be taken by the Mexicans as meaning that the 
Americans were perfectly willing to abide by the consequences 
of his refusal, and recall their minister promptly_ Slidell 
also did not wish to be present in the midst of a revolution, 
which he felt sure was coming- His reasoning was that if he 
was far away when it came, no one could accuse the U.S. of 
having undermined the Herrera Regime hoping for a better re-
ception from a new administration. Finally. being near to 
Vera Cruz and the American naval squadron, he believed that 
it would be easier for him to communicate with home, as well 
as receive instructions on how to proceed. 
Accordingly, he requested an escort from the Mexican 
government to convey him to Jalapa. The Mexicans stalled for 
nearly three weeks before complying with his request. pleading 
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the instability of the internal situation and the necessity 
of keeping all troops in the Capital. Slidell thought the 
delay was due to the fact that the Mexican government wanted 
him near in order to negotiate with him whenever they found 
it possible. Finally he received an escort, but before he 
left, he made known to the Mexicans through a confidante that 
the Americans were perfectly willing to relieve their fin-
ancial embarrassment for some small considerations. 1 
In the middle of December, the long-awaited revolution 
against Herrera began. As most had assumed, the most power-
ful of the military chiefs, Mariano Y Arillaga Paredes was 
the instigator. He issued a "revolutionary pronunciamento" 
on December 14, which detailed the reasons for his complete 
lack of confidence in the Herrera Regime. Among the com-
plaints alleged were, the fact that it had tried to avoid 
a just and honorable war with the U.S., and the fact that it 
had allowed a commissioner to come into the country from the 
United States. He further stated that the army was declaring 
all subsequent acts of the executive authorities and the 
present Congress null and void. They were both to cease 
functioning and prepare for the army to occupy the Capital. 
Paredes also intended to provide the country with a new 
t 't ' 2 cons 1. ut1.on. Although the Herrera Administration tried 
1Pletcher, OPe cit., p. 361, 
2Rives, Ope cit., pp. 72-73· 
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valiantly to resist this takeover, it soon found that the 
entire army was behind the move and resistance would be im-
possible. Paredes waited until he was certain that there 
would be no armed resistance, and then entered the Capital 
in a trumphant march on January 2, 1846. The foregoing 
series of events shocked Slidell, who remarked in a letter 
to Buchanan, 
When it is recollected that the civil authorities 
throughout the country • • • were opposed to the 
movement of Paredes • • • that both branches of 
Congress had unanimously declared their abhorence 
of his treachery • • • not a shot has been fired in 
defence of the constitutional government, and you 
may form some idea of the utter imbecility of the 
people, and of the uncontrolled supremary exercised by the army in this miscalled Republic. 
When Slidell's rejection became known in Washington, 
Polk decided to take firm action. He ordered General Zachary 
Taylor, with the Army of Texas, to proceed South and occupy 
the left bank of the Rio Grande River. Although this terri-
tory was disputed between the U.S. and Mexico, he reasoned 
that such strong action would underscore American determina-
tion not to give in. He further ordered a fleet assembled in 
the Gulf of Mexico where it would be prepared to move quickly 
in the event that hostilities should suddenly break out. 
Secretary Buchanan hinted at the possibility of stern American 
measures when he informed Slidell, "Should the Mexican 
lS1idell to Buchanan, January 14, 1846, DCUS, Ope cit., 
pp. 808-809. 
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government, by finally refusing to receive you, consumate the 
act of folly and bad faith of which they have afforded such 
strong indications, nothing will then remain for this govern-
ment but to take the redress of the wrongs of its citizens 
into its own hands."l The Secretary went on to compliment 
Slidell on his handling of the situation, in particular his 
attempts to put the entire blame for his lack of success on 
the Mexican government. He informed his emissary that the 
claims question and the problems of Texas could never be 
separated despite Mexican insistence. He concluded his 
letter by stating liThe desire of the President is that you 
should conduct yourself with such wisdom and firmness in the 
crisis, that the voice of the American people shall be 
unanimous in favor of redressing the wrongs of our much in-
jured and long suffering claimants.,,2 
Shortly after he wrote this dispatch, Buchanan received 
two further notes from Slidell detailing his official refusal 
by the Mexicans and the recent revolution. The Secretary 
was prompt in giving his Envoy new instructions on how to 
proceed. He informed Slidell that after a careful examination 
of the events which had taken place, the President ". • • en-
tirely approves your conduct," While the President was 
1Buchanan to Slidell, January 20, 1846, ibid., p. 186. 
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"sincerely desirous to preserve peace with Mexico •• 
• • 
Should Ltheil finally refuse to receive you, the cup of 
forbearance will then have been exhausted. Nothing can re-
main but to take the redress of the injuries to our citizens 
and the insults to our government into our own hands." 
Buchanan cautioned that "In view of the serious alternative, 
every honorable effort should be made before a ruptureo" 
But, if Slidell discovered that the Mexicans were "trifling 
with this government" he shOUld demand his passports and 
leave the country. The Secretary ended the dispatch by 
taking issue with Slidell over his statement that he felt it 
necessary for the Mexican government to retract the Pena note 
of December 21, 1845, before any talks proceeded. Buchanan 
stated "This might be a necessary preliminary, if there had 
been no change of government 0" But in view of the fact that 
there was a new Administration, " ••• such a retraction, 
however desirable, ought not to interpose an insuperable 
obstacle to negotiation."l 
During February the President decided to take further 
aggressive steps. In a Cabinet meeting on the seventeenth of 
that month, Polk suggested that Slidell " •• • demand an early 
decision of the Mexican government, whether they would re-
ceive him or not." If it refused, the American Envoy would 
1Buchanan to Slidell. January 28. 1846, ibid., pp. 187-
189. 
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be ordered to a warship on the Gulf of Mexico and the Presi-
dent would seek authorization from Congress to deliver an 
ultimatum to the Mexican government concerning a prompt 
settlement of matters in dispute. If the Mexicans refused 
this ultimatum, then the government could " •• • take redress 
into our own hands by aggressive measures ... l The entire 
Cabinet approved this idea with the exception of Buchanan, 
who argued that such a plan would cause the United States 
to make a quick choice between peace and war. In addition, 
waiting until Slidell returned would give further time for 
deliberations and Congress would probably be more coopera-
tive. After the Envoy's return, a naval officer could pre-
sent American demands, and if Mexico chose to cooperate, 
Slidell could return to that country.2 Polk took the matter 
under advisement and two days later, informed his Secretary 
of State that he would wait. Several reasons caused the 
President to act as he did. First, the extreme financial 
embarrassment of the Mexicans could force them into negotia-
tions. Secondly, if Slidell's description of the political 
climate in Mexico was true, further revolutions could occur 
at any time and bring to power a government willing to deal 
with her northern neighbor- Third, George Bancroft, 
lQuaife, OPe cit., ppo 233-234 • 
2Pletcher, opo cit., pp. 367-368. 
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secretary of War. was advised by a knowledgeable friend 
that Paredes was disguising his true feelings toward the U.S. 
and really wanted to negotiate. Finally, the Oregon ques-
tion was stirring up increasingly hostile feelings between 
the Americans and the British, and it would not be wise to 
have two heating pots coming to a boil at the same time. 1 
When Slidell received his additional instructions from 
Buchanan, he lost no time in contacting the new Mexican 
Foreign Minister. Castillo Y Lanzas. In a letter written 
on March 1, 1846, the American Envoy traced the history of 
his unsuccessful mission to that date, and informed the 
Mexicans that his government entirely approved of his actions 
in the case. He stated that had it not been for the revolu-
tion taking place and a new government coming to power, he 
would have demanded his passports and left the countryo But, 
since the change of Administrations in Mexico, "The President 
is unwilling to take a course which would inevitably result 
in war, without making another effort to avert so great a 
calamity 0 He wishes to demonstrate to the civilized world, 
that if peace shall be disturbed, the responsibility must 
fallon Mexico alone." He then concluded by requesting that 
a decision on whether or not he would be received be reached 
with as little delay as possible. 2 Slidell gave the letter 
2S1idell to Lanzas, March 1, 1846, DeUS, Opt cit., 
pp. 814-815-
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to Black to deliver, and instructed him to inform the 
Mexicans that if he did not rece;ve 
• a reply by the fifteenth 
of the month, he would demand his passports and leave. 
Slidell had some reasons to believe that this attempt 
to negotiate with the Mexicans would be successful. All 
their attempts to secure foreign loans had failed and the 
financial situation was becoming more acute with each pass-
ing day. Also, many Mexicans suspected that some foreign 
government would attempt to place a monarch in control of 
the country, and Mexico would revert back to its former 
colonial state. These fears tended to occupy the people's 
minds and lessen their clamor against the United States. And 
finally, General Almonte, who had occupied the post of 
Minister of War, had resigned quite suddenly. Since he was 
known to be a Yankee-hater, his absence from the Cabinet could 
quite possibly mean that there would be a change of hearto 
Slidell reasoned, "I have considered his presence in the 
Cabinet as offering an almost insuperable obstacle to any 
amicable adjustment of our differences Lhenc!7 his retire-
1 
ment at this juncture is a good omeno" 
Slidell's optimism proved to be unfounded. Lanzas sub-
mitted the question once again in the Council of Government, 
whose makeup, but not its philosophy, had changed. That body 
lSlidell to Buchanan, March 1, 1846. ibid., pp. 815-
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quickly considered the question, and determined that the 
earlier opinion which had. been rendered, still stood. They 
pointed out that menacing troop movements and warships on 
the Gulf offered proof that the Americans were acting in 
bad faith. Lanzas also sought foreign advice on the problem, 
going initially to Bermudez de Castro, the Spanish Minister. 
He advised against receiving Slidell since the Americans 
were, in his opinion, just searching for an excuse for war. 
Both Lanzas and Paredes consulted the British Minister 
Bankhead who suggested caution and urged the Mexicans to do 
nothing which might provoke their adversary. He advised the 
Mexicans to seek some alternative arrangements regarding 
Slidell and his credentials. That way they would learn 
whether the American Envoy possessed flexible instructions 
1 . t' 1 and a so ga~n ~me. 
The Mexican government chose to ignore the British 
advice, and, in a lengthy letter to Slidell on March 12, 
Lanzas informed him that " ••• the Mexican government can-
not receive him as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni-
potentiary." The Mexican Minister defended this action on 
several grounds. First the Americans had been making 
threatening moves and no self-respecting government could 
negotiate under such circumstances. The Americans had also 
iPletcher, OPe cit., p. )70. 
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manifested a "vehement desire" to despoil Mexico of her 
territory. There was, of course, the entire question of 
Texas which had outraged the whole country. Finally. by 
sending a full Minister Plenipotentiary, when Mexico had 
clearly agreed to treat with only a Commissioner, the United 
States had committed an act It. • • which the undersigned does 
not permit himself to qualify." He ended by stating that 
Mexico It ••• has offered herself and will continue to offer 
herself, open to all honorable means of conciliation •••• 
If war should finally become inevitable • 0 • the responsi-
bility will not fall upon Mexico. it will all rest upon the 
United States &, .. 1 
When Slidell received this letter from Lanzas, he con-
cluded that further hope for the success of his mission was 
futile. In a dispatch to the Mexican Minister he traced the 
history of the disputeo Slidell noted that the U.S. had 
never encouraged immigration to Texas, that the U.S. had at 
first refused to annex that territory, and further since the 
Mexican government could not hope to ever again exercise any 
authority over it. they had no right to attempt to control 
its destiny. He further asserted that his presence in the 
country, a full-fledged Minister, empowered to discuss all 
matters, was proof of good faith on the part of the United 





In a letter home to Buchanan the next day, Slidell 
informed him of his decision to demand his passports, and 
upon receiving them, would proceed to Vera Cruz, and from 
there to New Orleans. He stated that it was his belief that 
the Mexicans had refused him on two grounds, the first being 
that since Herrera had refused to accept him, no subsequent 
administration could do so without appearing cowardly. The 
other reason he felt was a reliance on foreign aid. The 
American Envoy remained suspicious of British motives stating 
that he believed Bankhead " • •• has interferred (sic) with 
the question of my reception in no friendly spirit. II He 
concluded with the dire prediction that " • •• we shall never 
be able to treat LWith Mexic£? until she has been taught to 
respect us •• ,,2 o • He repeated this view in somewhat 
harsher tones in an additional dispatch to Buchanan that same 
day, "Depend on it, we can never get along well with them 
until we have given them a good drubbing.,,3 
Although Lanzas delayed complying with the American 
Envoy's request for nearly two weeks, he finally relented and 




• historic arguments • • • which have been successfully 
lSlidell to Lanzas, March 17, 1846, ibid., pp. 824-828. 
2Slidell to Buchanan, March 18, 1846, ibid., pp. 828-
3S1idell to Buchanan. March 18, 1846, ibid., p. 8320 
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refuted by the Mexican government II h Id 
• •• e wou not bother 
himself with commenting.1 U . pon rece~ving the passport, 
Slidell left immediately for Vera Cruz. When he arrived 
there he was presented with a lengthy and somewhat surpris-
ing dispatch from Buchanan. In a letter dated March 12, the 
Secretary instructed his emissary not to leave Mexico until 
he had made at least one formal demand to be received, and 
that the President wanted him to return to Mexico City to 
make it, since it was possible that II. • • your presence there 
might be productive of the most beneficial consequenceso ll 
He further instructed Slidell to emphasize to the Mexicans, 
American willingness to relieve the financial embarrassment 
by the immediate payment of large sums of cash. The time for 
departure from Mexico was to be left up to Slidell since 
". • • it is impossible for those at a distance to decide as 
correctly what ought to be your course in this particular as 
you can yourself on the spot 0" However, Buchanan related 
that "The Oregon question is rapidly approaching a crisis" 
and while prospects for peace with Great Britain seemed good, 
"Your return to the United States before the result is known 
would produce considerable alarm in the public mind and might 
possibly exercise an injurious influence on our relations with 
Great Britain." The Secretary closed by stating "Much must 
necessarily be left to the discretion of the Envoy who, on 
lLanzas to Slidell, March 21, 1846, ibid., p. 834 • 
the spot, can take advantage of circumstances as they may 
arise; and the President is happy in believing that you 
possess all the qualifications necessary for the crisis .ltl 
Polk at this time appeared to be a man entirely mindful of 
the dual crisis his policies had engendered and was thus 
attempting to exercise some caution. 
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Slidell appeared to be flabbergasted at receiving 
these belated instructions. In a reply to Buchanan from on 
board the warship Mississippi which was conveying him to New 
Orleans, he stated his regret at not receiving the dispatch 
earlier, for if this had been the case, "I should have en-
deavored to find some plausible motive for prolonging my 
sojourn. II • • 0 In regard to the President's request that 
he return to Mexico City, Slidell indicated that he was con-
fident that If ••• my return there could have exercised no 
favorable influence on the question of my reception? and that 
to have done so ". 
national honor. u2 
• • would have been inconsistent with the 
As Slidell left for New Orleans, the situation in 
Mexico continued to deteriorate. Paredes, who by organizing 
a military revolution had hoped to bring stability to the 
country, found just the opposite had occurred. Ironically he 
1 Sl'd 11 March 12. 1846, ibid., ppo 189-Buchanan to 1 e , 
192. 
2Slidell to Buchanan, April 2, 1846, ibid., p. 837. 
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found himself denounced by opposition and the public for not 
dealing decisively with the Americans much as he himself had 
denounced Herrera. When he atte t d t mp e 0 move an army to the 
north to counter Taylor's move to the Rio Grande, a mutiny 
broke out among the soldiers and it was some time before this 
could be put down. Rumors that he favored a monarchist plot 
to place a foreign prince in control of Mexico abounded, and 
when forced to issue a manifesto to the contrary, his finance 
minister resigned under protest. His manifesto stated that 
the administration would not recognize the American claim to 
Texas, but neither would it take decisive action there. This 
led to outright charges of cowardice. Finally the Minister 
of War, Juan Almonte resigned and began organizing a movement 
against the government. When Paredes became suspicious, he 
sent Almonte on a diplomatic mission to France in order to 
get him out of the country. Almonte only pretended to leave, 
however, and after starting mild insurrections against the 
Administration in the southern part of the country, he pro-
ceeded to go to Cuba and join forces with the exiled leader, 
Santa Annao 1 
As the situation headed toward a climax, General Taylor 
reache~ the Rio Grande and set up camp near the present site 
of Brownsville, Texas. He tried to reassure the native 
population there that his intentions were peaceful, and that 
lPletcher, Opt cito, pp. 372-373-
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he and his troops needed to purchase supplies and would pay 
the highest market price for them. Since Polk had authorized 
him to proceed as far into the disputed territory as 
Matamoros, Taylor and his army then moved south toward that 
city- Aware that this action would probably be interpreted 
as threatening. he sent his second-in-command to contact the 
Mexican commander at Matamoros and assure him that the 
Americans had no warlike motives. He also proposed a joint 
occupation of the border until negotiations between the two 
countries had been completed. The Mexicans, however. refused 
to be convinced so easily, and Taylor soon realized that they 
were making preparations for war. He. in turn. began con-
struction of a fort in order to be prepared for any eventu-
ality.1 
On April 17. President Polk wrote to Slidell who had 
stopped in New Orleans, urging him to proceed at once to 
Washington where he could supply needed information on the 
current Mexican situation. He assured his Envoy that he would 
take no action until his arrival. Although the President 
was anxious to resolve matters, sound reasons existed for him 
to delay_ All dispatches from Mexico, including Slidell's, 
indicated a growing dissatisfaction with the Paredes Regime. 
and only time could tell whether that Administration would 
survive_ If it did not, a new government might be willing to 
1Ibide, pp. 374-375· 
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accept American terms. Also th 0 
, e regon question now occupied 
the forefront, and, while it appeared that crisis could be 
settled peacefully, it would be best to wait before initiation 
of any action in another area. Finally, leading members of 
Congress, such as John C. Calhoun and Thomas Benton, advised 
him to delay until after Oregon was settled. In a cabinet 
meeting on April 25, the President stated that "0 • • we must 
take redress for the injuries done us unto our own hands, 
that we have attempted to conciliate Mexico in vain, and had 
forborne until forbearance was no longer either a virtue or 
patriotic • • • and 0 • • we should take a bold and firm 
course toward Mexico 0" However, he expressed a willingness 
to wait until Slidell's arrival before taking any decisive 
action. He did intend, nevertheless, to take the matter to 
Congress before that body adjourned for the summer.l 
On May 8, Slidell arrived in Washington and Buchanan 
accompanied him to the White House. The Secretary of State 
stayed for only a short time, and when he left, Polk and 
Slidell conversed for an hour about the Envoy's mission. 
Slidell recommended to the President that he take stern 
d Y " Polk informed him measures with "promptness an energ • 
that he would send a message to Congress, probably as early 
as the next week. 2 The following day, in a Cabinet meeting. 
the President stated his belief that already there existed 
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ample cause for war, and that he should send 
. a message to 
Congress recommending "definitive measures" by the following 
Tuesday 0 The members of the Cabinet unanimously agreed if 
the Mexicans attacked Taylor, they should send Congress an 
immediate war message. Differences of opinion existed on 
whether to recommend war on the basis of what had already 
taken place. Buchanan and most members sided with the 
President in the affirmative, but Secretary Bancroft replied 
t . 1 in the nega J.ve. The meeting broke up without reaching 
agreement on the question, and Polk asked the members to re-
turn Tuesday to help him draft his message to Congress_ 
Later that day, Polk received word that on April 25, the 
Mexicans had attacked a small body of his soldiers who were 
on reconnaisance, whereupon the President reconvened the 
Cabinet that night. This time there was no objection to a 
war message. 
In his war message to Congress, delivered on Monday, 
May 11, Polk traced the long history of American grievances 
against Mexico stressing the Illiberal and honorable li terms 
which the United States had offered her and the "fair and 
equi table" principles on which this country operated. In 
speaking of the mission of John Slidell, the President stated 
his firm belief that the Herrera Administration would have 
ultimately received the American minister had it not been 
lQuaife. OPe cit., pp. 353-354. 
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overthrown by a military revolution. The Paredes Regime had 
rejected Slidell ". • • in terms that may be considered as 
giving just grounds of offense to ••• the United States_ 
In doing so, it had ". • • violated [ltv plighted faith. 
• • II 
for they had agreed to receive an American representative. 
The message also dealt at length with the unpaid claims which 
were owed to Americans, but the greatest offense Polk saved 
for last. The Mexicans had now ". • • invaded our terri tory 
and shed American blood on the American soil. • • • War 
exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, 
exists by the act of Mexico herself. tI In concluding his 
message, the President asked Congress to recognize that a 
state of war existed between the two countries, and that the 
administration be given authority to make appropriations and 
raise a volunteer force. 1 Congress. after some debate in 
both houses, extended its approval. War had come to the 
"Sister Republics. 1t 
The key point in analyzing the mission of John Slidell 
has always regarded President Polk's intentions in the 
matter. Did he intend for the mission to be a failure from 
the beginning, thereby creating a war in which his territorial 
ambitions could be realized? While this viewpoint seems to 
b .. , number of proponents. it is one with e ga1n1ng an increas1ng 
Ii ttle basis in fact and powerful arguments in opposition. 
IHenry Steele Commager, Documents of American Histo 
(New York, Appleton-century-Crofts, 1968 , pp. 310-311 • 
However, once it is established that Polk sincerely wanted 
the mission to succeed, a further point remains. Did the 
bargaining position which he set forth permit a negotiated 
settlement with the Mexicans on any basis other than a com-
plete American victory? It appears that this question must 
be answered in the negative, and it is this last point which 
casts the responsibility for the failure of the mission 
squarely on the shoulders of the President. 
Polk sent an emissary, John Slidell. to Mexico in the 
fall of 1845 with instructions to accomplish several goals. 
He wanted to bring the long smouldering question of American 
claims on Mexico to a conclusion as quickly as possible. He 
also desired to erect a permanent boundary between Texas and 
her southern neighbor. preferably one that would give the 
U.S. claim to the wide expanse of territory down to the Rio 
Grande Rivero He further hoped to add valuable territorial 
acquisitions to the country by purchasing New Mexico and 
whatever part of California territory he could persuade the 
Mexicans to part witho A careful examination of the facts 
surrounding the mission would lead one to the conclusion 
that Polk must be absolved of charges that he deliberately 
provoked a war with Mexico. 
In order to establish clearly the foregoing conclusion, 
one must scrutinize closely several facets of the mission, 
beginning with the selection of John Slidell to be the Envoy 
sent to Mexico. In naming the Louisiana Congressman, Polk 
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chose someone whom he admittedly If. • 
• had very little per-
sonal acquaintance with • • • tI having done so 
solely "0 • • on 
Mr. Buchanan I s recommendation. ,,1 N' elther he, nor any other 
cabinet member who was present at the time of the selection, 
ever mentioned any other person being considered. Other 
persons actively sought the post, in particular Senator 
Ambrose Sevier of Arkansas, with whom the President was very 
familiar. Nor can it be said that Polk had the appointment 
forced upon him by his Secretary of State, for Polk had 
recently rejected Buchanan's choice for the Supreme Court, 
which caused some hard feelings between them. It seems clear, 
then, that Slidell was chosen solely on the basis of his 
friendship with Buchanan and his qualifications for the job. 
These included an interest in Mexican affairs, as well as a 
fluency in the Spanish language. If Polk designed the mis-
sion from the beginning to be a failure. or if he intended 
somehow to deceive the Mexicans, why would he entrust so 
delicate a task to an unknown quantity such as Slidell? It 
would seem much more likely that he would have selected a 
crony of his, of whom there were several in the Washington 
area alone. A person with whom he was on intimate terms 
could be expected to keep any clandestine secrets to himself, 
in respect to the President's wishes. In addition to this, 
the President chose not to have a pre-mission conference with 
lQuaife, OPe cit., p. 232. 
his envoy, but instead communicated with him t' 1 en lre y by 
mail. This was done despite the fact that t' . lme eXlsted for 
such a conference while Consul John Black was obtaining 
official assurances from Mexico regarding the mission. If 
Polk had secret instructions for his envoy. he would most 
certainly have communicated those to him orally rather than 
by post. If Polk intended the mission to fail, it seems 
clear that his envoy was not aware of it. 
Another point which must be made is that much was 
left to the discretion of the envoy himself, mce he was 
present in Mexico. On several occasions highly sensitive de-
cisions were left up to Slidello In the lengthy instructions 
which he received at the outset of the mission, Secretary 
Buchanan stated, "The views and wishes of the President are 
before you, and much at last must be left to your own dis-
cretiono"l In a later dispatch, Buchanan, after authorizing 
Slidell to pay large sums of money and again impressing him 
with the importance of the mission, concluded, "All is 
confided to your judgment and discretion. 1I2 Polk even left 
the question of when to declare the mission a failure and 
return home up to the envoy, as Buchanan informed him that 
!lIn regard to the time of your departure from the Mexican 
lBuchanan to Slidell, November 10, 1845, DeUS, OPe 
cit., p. 181. 
2Buchanan to Slidell, December 17, 1845, ibid., p. 
184. 
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Republic, the President is willing to exte d . 
n your d~scre-
tion. ,,1 It seems likely that had Polk not . t d ~n en ed the mis-
sion to be successful, he would not have allowed an unknown 
envoy such freedom of action. He would t mos assuredly have 
given specific instructions to Slidell, so that his wishes, 
and his alone. would be carried out. 
Further proof that Polk desired for the mission to 
succeed comes after Slidell's first rejection by the Herrera 
Regime. The President resolved not to let this rebuff abort 
the mission, but instead instructed his envoy that in view of 
the serious consequences which could result, he should make 
"0 • • every honorable effort • • • JI to negotiate and should 
n 
• • • wait patiently for a final decision on the question of 
your reception. ,,2 Later. Slidell was advised to remain in 
Mexico if II • • 0 you should indulge a reasonable hope, that 
by continuing in Mexico you could thus best subserve the 
interests of your countryo"J Also, the fact that Polk 
ordered Slidell to return to Mexico City from Jalapa when 
he made his second request to ·be received, must be considered. 
In giving this order, Polk reasoned that Slidell would be 
closer to the Mexican government. and that this would be 
1 Buchanan to Slidell, March 12, 1846, ibid., p. 1910 
2Buchanan to Slidell, January 28, 1846, ibid., p. 187-
3Buchanan to Slidell, March 12, 1846, ibid _, p. 1910 
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viewed as a sign that the U.S. was resolved to make every 
effort to bring about negotiations. Polk also felt that he 
would be better able to make known his government's willing-
ness to relieve Mexican financial embarrassment. 
Two further extracts from the instructions provide 
additional proof of Polk's intentions. At one point Slidell 
requested that he be informed as to what cou~e to take if, 
in the discussion of claims, the Mexicans themselves pre-
sented a list of claims that they had on the United States. 
Since none were known to exist, this must have presented a 
slight problem. However. it was one that could have been 
dealt with very easily by simply instructing the envoy to 
reject any such notion, since the claims commission had not 
recognized any. Instead, Polk extended Slidell " ••• full 
power embracing authority to treat all claims of the govern-
ment and citizens of Mexico against the United States •• •• " 
Secretary Buchanan told the envoy that "Should any be pre-
sented in the course of your negotiations, whether arising 
from Commodore Jones occupation of Monterey or any other 
cause, you will not fail to give them a careful and thorough 
examination. ,,1 This would seem to indicate a willingness on 
the part of the President to appear reasonable if negotia-
tions were begun. 
Another factor which must be taken into consideration, 
lBuchanan to Slidell, January 28, 1846, ibid., p. 188. 
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regards Slidell's contention that Pena's note of December 21 
be retracted before negotiations began. Had the Polk admin-
istration been searching for ways of assuring the mission's 
failure, they would have needed only to approve this course 
for their emissary or, at least, keep silent about it. Cer-
tainly no Mexican government, or any self-respecting country. 
would dare retract such a statement as a condition for negoti-
ationo Instead of this, Polk overruled Slidell by telling 
him that such a retraction would not be necessary as a pre-
lude to his reception. He was instructed to proceed as if 
the note had never been written. It seems clear from this 
that the President desired to remove obstacles which might 
be in the way of the success of the mission. 
The large amounts which were offered for various por-
tions of Mexican territory offer further proof of Polk's 
sincerity. Buchanan told Slidell initially that he could 
offer twenty-five million dollars plus assume the unpaid 
claims against Mexico, if he could successfully negotiate a 
treaty which would settle the boundary of Texas and include 
California and New Mexico. In a subsequent letter to 
Slidell, Polk intimated that he could go even higher than 
those figures if he felt it necessary to secure the desired 
boundaries. When it is remembered that at the time Mexico 
was thoroughly destitute and had little or no prospects for 
changing that condition, one can realize that such sums of 
money would be sorely tempting- In addition, Mexico would 
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not be parting with any area which she either controlled or 
considered vital to her survival. Polk and many other ob-
servors certainly felt that Mexico, in her condition, would 
not be able to pass up such sums. In view of these circum-
stances, Slidell was twice instructed to let U.S. willingness 
to relieve Mexican financial troubles be known. As one can 
never be certain to what lengths a starving man will go to 
obtain food, neither could one make any assumptions regarding 
what a financially pressed country would do to obtain funds. 
One other factor which must be brought out concerning 
the payment of money to Mexico, is Polk's desire to create 
for Slidell a one-million dollar contingency fund. The envoy 
could use this at his discretion to obtain a favorable settle-
mente Polk reasoned that since Mexico was in such dire 
financial straits, the army might soon discontinue support 
for General Paredes unless money could be obtained within a 
short time. If Slidell had in his possession funds with 
which to make an immediate payment, the odds for success 
would be enhancedo As Polk himself stated "Indeed I thought 
that the prompt payment of such a sum might induce [paredes? 
to make a treaty which he would not otherwise venture to 
make,,,l The Cabinet agreed with this view, but some, 
including Buchanan, were skeptical as to whether such a fund 
could be obtained from Congress without jeopardizing the 
lQuaife, OPe cit., pp. 306-307. 
94 
secrecy of its intent. The President believed that such an 
appropriation could be passed through both houses of Congress, 
and cited an act passed in 1806 during the Jefferson admin-
istration which created a similar fund of two million dollars. 
Polk decided to sound out members of Congress as to their 
willingness to support such legislation. Although the fund 
never materialized, the fact that Polk was willing to go to 
such lengths to obtain one, would seem to furnish ample evi-
dence of his desire to purchase, rather than conquer, de-
sired territories from Mexico. 
Although the foregoing offers some proof of Polk's 
sincere desire for the mission to succeed, there remains the 
question concerning his terms for negotiation. Did they 
permit any settlement at all on terms other than a complete 
American victory? The answer to this question is, unfor-
tunately, no. While it might appear from the viewpoint of 
Polk and the American side that the proffered terms were 
reasonable, to the Mexicans they most assuredly were not. A 
careful examination reveals that circumstances had placed 
the Mexican government in a nearly untenable positiono The 
only means by which they could have extracted themselves was 
an American Presddent who was sensitive to their problems, and 
who would extend to them some type of settlement which would 
allow them to regain lost prestige. Polk was most certainly 
not that man. 
An investigation of the conditions Polk set forth for 
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negotiations leads one to the conclusion that the Mexicans 
had good reason to reject them all. First, to receive 
Slidell, would have meant that a resumption of diplomatic 
relations had taken placeD The Mexicans, of course, con-
sidered themselves to be the injured party in the matter 
regarding Texas annexation. Since they had broken off rela-
tions with the U.S., they could not reasonably be expected 
to resume them without some concession. Polk was unwilling 
to concede anything_ He believed that a strong U.S. stand 
would force a resumption of relations without the U.S. having 
to concede anything. 
Polk's terms for a settlement offered no hope of suc-
cessful negotiations taking place. He instructed Slidell to 
consider the annexation of Texas to be an accomplished fact 
and to press for the most extravagant boundary Claim. If 
the Mexicans agreed to this. tne United States government 
would assume the claims of American citizens amounting to 
roughly two million dollars. In other words, Mexico was 
to concede a large portion of what she could rightfully call 
her own territory in exchange for U.S. assumption of claims 
which she had disputed from the beginning. Clearly this was 
not something which the Mexicans could logically agree to. 
Polk fUrther instructed Slidell to purchase whatever 
portions of New Mexico and California he could persuade the 
Mexicans to sell. For these he was to offer large sums of 
moneyo Acquisition of California especially, had been a goal 
of Polk's from the beginning of his administration.1 He 
reasoned that, due to the chaotic conditions which existed 
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in these two regions, Mexico could easily be persuaded to 
part with them. This would be especially true if an offer to 
relieve them of their acute financial embarrassment was made. 
Polk quite obviously erred in these assumptions. While it 
might be true that Mexico had a tenuous hold on California 
and New Mexico. it still considered them to be parts of their 
country. To allow themselves to part with the northern one-
third of their country and gain only monetary rewards would 
be a national disgrace which no administration, regardless 
of its position, could consider. 
Finally, Polk entertained little or no regard for the 
Mexican people themselves. Although he distrusted the 
British intensely and maintained a strong stance in all re-
lations with them, there is ample evidence that he also had 
a healthy respect for them. During his entire dealings with 
Mexico. no similar respect manifests itself. While he was 
c.autious in his public statements, he still referred at times 
to "a system of outrage and distortion" and a "subverted 
government 0" Statements such as these and others like them 
are indicative of the low esteem in which he held the nation's 
lPolk revealed this in a conversation with George 
Bancroft. See Sellers, OPe cit., p. 213· 
southern neighbor. 1 Clearly Polk believed that what no 
American or British people would countenance for a moment, 
the Mexicans could be persuaded to accept. 
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In summary, it must be concluded that a careful exam-
ination of all circumstances surrounding the John Slidell 
Mission to Mexico, reveals that President Polk (1) sincerely 
desired a negotiated settlement of the dispute regarding the 
annexation of Texas and the American claims; (2) genuinely 
desired to secure a boundary with Mexico that would give New 
Mexico and a large portion of California to the United States; 
(3) offered terms to Mexico which precluded the possibility 
of any settlement; (4) was prepared at all times to back up 
his peaceful overtures with the threat of military force, 
and to use this force if necessary. One can reach the addi-
tional conclusion that had the mission of John Slidell suc-
cessfully completed its objectives, the Mexican War in all 
probability. would never have been fought. However, the 
chances for this were for all practical purposes, non-existent. 
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